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‘Emmanuel Levinas is rapidly becoming recognized as one of  the most impor-
tant ethical philosophers of  the twentieth century, if  not of  the entire modern 
period.  The impact of  his original and powerful claim that “ethics is fi rst phi-
losophy” is now spreading through the humanities and social sciences, especially 
psychology, education and political theory.  It is only natural, then, and welcome, 
that we begin to re-think economics and business ethics aided and enriched by 
his perspicacious insights.’ Richard A. Cohen, University at Buffalo (SUNY)
‘Rather than succumbing to the easy temptation to blame business leaders for 
anything that went wrong in recent years, Aasland looks for the remnants of  
good in business as such. This leads him to ask the right questions: one should, 
for example, not ask why a leader did the wrong thing but why such a leader did 
not do it. A thought-provoking and hugely original essay is the outcome of  this 
approach.’ René ten Bos, Radboud University, The Netherlands
While today many express astonishment at ‘ethical scandals’ in business, in this 
important new book Dag G. Aasland asks why, in capitalist economies, such 
scandals are not more common or even the norm. Taking his lead from the 
ethical philosophy of  Emmanuel Levinas, this book proposes a thoroughgoing 
reconsideration of  the meaning of  ethics and economy. This elegantly written 
text offers a clear statement of  the importance of  a Levinasian ethics of  the 
Other for thinking through and beyond the limits and persistence of  economic 
rationality. This book invites readers to step beyond the enclosure of  business 
ethics and takes us beyond ‘business as usual’ but also beyond ‘ethics as usual’.
Dag G. Aasland is Professor of  Economics and Head of  the Department of  
Working Life and Innovation at the University of  Agder, Norway. For the last 
few years his teaching and research has concentrated on ethics in business and 
management, especially from the perspective of  the works of  Levinas.
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Introduction 
‘Ethical failures’ in business: why not? 
From time to time we are presented with cases in the news media where 
named business leaders are accused of having done something they 
should not have done. They may have received gifts or money from 
business partners or they may have paid to gain an advantage over their 
competitors. The allegation hidden behind such cases is that a boundary 
has been crossed; a boundary that is drawn by the laws that are set up to 
regulate market competition, by some internal guidelines the company 
has set up to take care of the external image of the company, or by 
some diffuse ethical rules for what society may allow its citizens. 
Confronted with a series of such examples, how should we 
approach the topic of ethics in business? First, it is hard to tell how 
singular such cases in fact may be. It is easy to believe that they occur 
more frequently than what the news media either discover or choose to 
report. Secondly, in many cases it is actually quite easy to understand 
why the leaders who are criticised may have acted as they have done. 
With constant pressure from their owners to achieve continuously 
better results and with a perspective where the world, quite naturally, is 
viewed from their own position and from that of their company, it is 
often easy to understand why the leader in question may have stretched 
the boundaries to obtain a highest possible gain, either for themselves 
or for their company – which, in many cases, is not the same: some 
‘ethical failures’ are made to obtain a personal gain, others are made to 
obtain a higher gain for the company. Both kinds are often easily 
understandable, so the reactions which the media seek to provoke in the 
public may thus easily take the form of hypocrisy. Also, to better 
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understand these cases and how they are presented, it might be useful to 
see how they play on important aspects of social psychology. Negative 
reactions from the press and society may be seen to express a deeper, 
underlying wish among all of us to preserve the idea that such events 
indeed are exceptions, and that leaders and other decision makers 
mainly operate within all visible and invisible borders. This idea is 
important to stick to, as, if not, order should turn into chaos. When we 
then, once in a while, are reminded that reality is not ordered as well as 
we want it to be, this is experienced as scary, and in such cases it is a 
well known human trait to designate scapegoats. 
The original scapegoats were real goats designated to symbolise the 
sins and the bad consciences of the people, and then chased out in the 
desert to die (Leviticus 16: 8-10). Later, through history, many kinds of 
scapegoats have been appointed who have threatened the ruling order, 
with witch burning as one of the worst examples. The question of who 
are the ‘witches’ of today, and how they are ‘burned’ will not be further 
elaborated here; I shall leave that to the readers to reflect upon. 
Concerning business leaders, however, we note that the normal 
procedure is to remove him from his position (for simplicity of 
expression I choose to refer to the business leader as ‘he’), paying him a 
considerable amount, maybe as an excuse that this time it happened to 
be him who was appointed to play the ritual role as scapegoat. And 
then, as soon as the scapegoat is out of the way, it is a part of the idea 
that the problem is gone with him and everyone can go back to the 
initial order. In this way we may preserve the idea that such disturbances 
in the necessary order are only singular exceptions. 
Let me here, so as not to cause any misunderstanding, make it clear 
that I do not argue, and even less mean to prove, that such actions are 
more common than I may have reason to believe; nor shall I claim that 
the theory of scapegoats is adequate to every case. In this context, it is 
sufficient to note these moments as possibilities. These possibilities, 
both that such acts are more common than we usually believe them to 
be, and that the reactions from society could be rationalised by our need 
to appoint scapegoats in order to preserve the idea of a good, universal 
order, makes it possible to obtain a more manageable perspective on the 
problems concerning ethics, and the lack of ethics, in business and 
economy. I shall describe this perspective as follows: acts that are 
criticised as morally bad are actually easy to understand as they in most 
cases follow directly either from what is considered as being expected 
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from a business leader in the direction of pursuing the financial interests 
of the company, or from the universally human property of maximising 
one’s own share in the distribution of goods in society. Is it not instead 
the cases were business leaders and other decision makers resist the 
temptation to follow the interest of themselves, or that of their 
companies, which need to be explained? Within the framework of 
business logic it is of course also possible to explain cases of good 
behaviour. The relentless pursuit of more profit is of course limited 
both by legal and market mechanisms, in the sense that a bad reputation 
may reduce the economic results of the company (and vice versa: a good 
image may improve it); one sanction which leaders try to avoid is being 
brought into focus for having done something that may be viewed as 
being on the ‘borderline’, even if it is not illegal (and maybe instead 
keeping oneself on the right side of, and in a safe distance to, this 
border). I shall look closer at these mechanisms in chapter 3; they are 
thoroughly discussed in the field of knowledge called ‘business ethics’ or 
‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR). However, claims that moral 
limits are created only by legal and economic institutions may be hard to 
accept, because they threaten the desired idea of the ‘good’ in man as 
something more fundamental than social institutions. However, to 
renounce the assumption of a basic ‘good order’ in society is not the 
same as denying the existence of the good, quite the opposite: to take 
the good for granted may be an efficient way to ignore it. 
The easiest thing to understand is that all individuals are closer to 
themselves and their own wellbeing than to that of others. So much the 
more important then becomes the question why everyone does not 
always act according to this. Looking at everyday life it is easy to find 
examples where people do not at all, at least not all the time, act in the 
way that is best for them. To observe this, however, we will mostly have 
to rely on personal experience, as news items in the media concerning 
benevolent acts do not have the same market value as their opposite, for 
the reasons already mentioned: we don’t want to believe that they are 
worthy of being cases in the news, as we instead want them to belong to 
normality. (One should always remind oneself that what is presented in 
the news media does not mirror the common view of reality, but rather 
the exceptions from this view). 
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Two questions and a perspective 
Based on the discussion above the question should be asked why one 
would be interested in doing something other than that which gives one 
the highest gains. To be more precise, I shall divide this question in two: 
1. From where does the idea that it is possible to do otherwise than 
privileging oneself over others come? 
2.This idea, which we may call ‘the idea of the good’, or, as we will 
call it here, ethics – how is it transformed into practical conduct? 
In this book these two questions will be approached step by step, with 
the purpose of arriving at possible answers. The approach to ethics in 
business described above, leading to the two questions, also implies a 
perspective that is somewhat different from how ethics commonly is 
discussed. Instead of asking the unfortunate business leaders ‘How 
could you?’, I shall instead ask those who do not bring themselves into 
such embarrassing positions ‘What keeps you from doing it?’ In other 
words, instead of taking the risk to end (or start) up with a moralistic 
attitude, I shall search for the good which is already there, as small as it 
may be. Instead of introducing a normative approach through telling 
others what is right and wrong, I shall instead introduce the normative 
by considering how the subject – the I – becomes responsible. In this I 
shall to a large extent lean on the works of the French-Jewish 
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. This explains the subtitle of the book: 
After Levinas. At first sight it may seem contradictory that a book 
which starts with the history of economic thought and leads up to a 
presentation of Levinas is titled ‘After Levinas’. The explanation is that 
the whole book is written in the light of the philosophy of Levinas, a 
light that also casts its beams back onto history and helps us to see it in 
a new way. One could thus wish that the English word ‘after’ also had 
the meaning of ‘according to’ in the same way as the corresponding 
French word après. 
The book is organised in three parts. On my way towards answers to 
two questions raised above, I shall first consider the logic, the thought 
and reasoning of business and the economic system. This is the purpose 
of the first two chapters. I will show how and why economic logic and 
reasoning is based on self-interest. However, this fact itself does not 
suffice for moral criticism. Rather, it implies that the economic system 
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and its way of reasoning have a limited validity. After having discussed 
economic thought in general, I shall proceed to so-called ‘business 
ethics’, a knowledge from which business leaders can learn how they 
can meet ethical challenges from the environment, and preferably pre-
empt them, to the advantage of themselves and their own companies. I 
will show how this knowledge fits well within the self-centred 
perspective of economic reasoning and business logic. 
The easily recognisable self-centred perspective of ‘business ethics’ 
makes it easy for everyone to criticise this field from a perspective of 
‘real ethics’. However, the two questions posed in the introduction may 
help us to avoid falling into the ‘moralising trap’ of an ethical 
perspective. By what right do I ask another person why he or she fails 
ethically? As already explained, we will instead ask why ethical failures 
don’t occur all the time. The first part will therefore end with a restating 
of the two questions, leading us to the question whether it is at all 
possible to understand ethics, knowing that all understanding is 
subjective and thus self-centred; in other words, establishing a 
perspective opposite to that of ethics. Thus, I will explore the 
phenomenon of subjectivity further, before I return to the two 
questions once more. 
Subjectivity is the theme of the second part of the book, containing 
two chapters that more or less can be considered as the pivotal point of 
the line of argument. First, in chapter 3, developments in the theory of 
knowledge and understanding will be presented, showing how we have 
learned to cope with the experience that each subject understands reality 
in his or her own way. Then, in chapter 4, I will show how imaginative 
literature, here represented by two plays of Henrik Ibsen, may express 
the subjectivity of ethics in ways that cannot be done in languages 
constrained by the academic rules of logic and consistency. 
From the discussion so far we may perceive that self-interest in 
general and in economic activities and reasoning especially is 
indispensable, but at the same time that their validity is limited, as there 
is no room for the idea that it is possible to do otherwise than pursuing 
one’s self-interest, an idea which I have here named ‘ethics’. The third 
part is dedicated to an investigation into this idea. In chapter 5 I present 
how ethics (in the sense of the word described above) forms a base for 
a whole group of professions, formulated as an ethics of either care, 
relations or closeness, and which is applied in professions of the welfare 
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state in particular. But I will also show how this ethics meets a severe 
problem in its confrontation with economic reality, which is not only a 
special way of thinking (in which case the problem would be easier to 
overcome) but more than that. Then, in chapter 6, I will show how 
Emmanuel Levinas, through his work, exactly points at how ethics, in 
the meaning of the idea of the good, in spite of the contradiction 
between ethics and economic reality, is transformed daily into practical 
conduct. I then summarise the line of reasoning in the book, followed 
by a conclusion. I go back to the two questions raised above and 
suggest answers to them. Finally, I will discuss the consequences these 
conclusions may have on practical life, politics and the further 
development of knowledge. 
 
 ECONOMIC RATIONALITY 

  9 
1 
The Development of Economic Thought 
The historical roots 
In order to better understand the logic and way of thinking and 
reasoning in business and the economic system, I shall begin with a 
short review of how economic thought has emerged and developed. I 
shall go back nearly three hundred years in history, to the era known as 
‘The Age of Enlightenment’ in Europe, which more or less coincides 
with the eighteenth century. In our conventional way of organising our 
history, that is, the history of Europe, the time of enlightenment 
succeeded the Renaissance; the era of many of the great discoveries, 
represented by, amongst others, the scientists Nicolaus Copernicus 
(1473-1543), Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) 
and Isaac Newton (1642-1727). The Age of Enlightenment was later 
followed by the era we call ‘modernity’. The Age of Enlightenment was 
a time of liberation and disengagement from authorities in several fields. 
Common people revolted against serfdom and feudalism, while 
scientists defied the power of the church in the question of what should 
be valid knowledge and what should be held as truth. Participation in 
these kinds of revolt entailed a certain risk. During the Renaissance, for 
instance, Galileo was persecuted by the church for giving his support to 
the Copernican theory claiming the Earth is not the centre of the 
Universe. Revolts against kings and emperors were, of course, also an 
engagement involving high risk and there was considerable bloodshed 
during these European battles of liberation. Both the American and the 
French revolution were strong expressions of this revolt. From the 
French revolution we all know the slogan ‘Freedom, equality, fraternity!’ 
In the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 we find the 
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following formulation, which every schoolchild in USA since then has 
had to learn by heart: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; 
that among these, are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That, 
to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving 
their just Powers from the consent of the governed. That, whenever any 
form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right 
of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, 
laying its foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in 
such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and 
Happiness. (Hancock et al., 1776: 510) 
It is easy to read between the lines in such declarations the strong need 
of revolt but also the great enthusiasm and optimism which 
accompanied these efforts of liberation. 
One of the most epoch-making ideas in that time was that of 
individual freedom and rights. Already during the Renaissance René 
Descartes (1596-1650) had worded the sentence ‘Cogito, ergo sum’, 
meaning ‘I think, therefore I am’. By this statement, Descartes meant 
that because I think, I can also know that, if nothing else is so, at least I 
exist. This insight stimulated not only a further development of the 
theory of knowledge driven by the thinking subject, but also 
developments towards a clearer consciousness of the I, as an 
autonomous being with freedom to think, and not at least to speak, 
whatever he or she wills. 
The technical inventions of that time along with the liberation of the 
I prepared the ground for what has been called ‘The Industrial 
Revolution’, which again stimulated the natural sciences to their great 
triumphs. In this way there exists a continuous line from the 
Renaissance through the Age of Enlightenment to modern time, where 
one could imagine that the individual, with help from the conquests of 
science and democratic governance, should liberate him or herself from 
all suppression, where sufferings and poverty should be abolished once 
and for all, as these conditions were considered consequences of a lack 
of knowledge and democracy. This idea was clearly expressed in the 
constitutions set up by several nations by the end of the eighteenth 
century: The United States in 1787, France in 1791 (and other smaller 
nations followed, such as Norway in 1814). Essential points in these 
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constitutions were the freedom of the individual from casual exercise of 
power, in addition to other rights, such as the right to property, freedom 
of speech, the right to criticise one’s leaders, the right to have a private 
life and to bring one’s cause to the court. 
In this enthusiasm about individual freedom and rights, ethics was 
also understood as something that is embedded in each, autonomous 
individual, as this was formulated by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). His 
main work is considered to be Critique of Pure Reason, while his main 
contribution to moral philosophy is Critique of Practical Reason. These 
titles, however, do not mean that Kant was critical of reason in any 
sense, rather the opposite. According to Kant, reason is what makes us 
human, not only as rational but also as moral individuals. The word 
‘critique’ indicates Kant’s method, which was to let sense experiences 
and critical thought reciprocally correct each other. 
Kant is often associated with the term ‘ethics of duty’, which may 
easily be misunderstood. He brought the idea of the autonomy of the 
individual one step further. He warned against all kinds of obedient 
subjection to duties imposed from above, whether from the church or 
the state. In all individuals the moral law is embedded as part of their 
practical reason. Thus, there must be a free will with which the 
individual, through reason, chooses to follow the duties prescribed by 
the moral law. The moral law is a universal principle, meaning that it 
does not distinguish between persons, and Kant formulated it as what 
he called ‘the categorical imperative’: Act only according to that maxim by 
which you can at the same time will that it would become a universal law. This is 
not a principle he claims to have invented; it has always been there; his 
contribution was to help formulate it. It follows from the categorical 
imperative that the ethics of Kant values the purpose and intention of 
an act more than its consequence and result. Kant was optimistic in his 
view of the future of social development. By nature, humans are neither 
good nor bad; we are by birth not moral beings, but follow our inborn 
natural inclinations. But we become moral individuals when reason 
develops within us through the concepts of the moral law. By 
developing our moral freedom to follow the moral law we can liberate 
ourselves from the determination of the world and create a good society 
with freedom and a government based on the will of the people, as it is 
for instance expressed in the American Declaration of Independence, 
which was written exactly at his time. 
Ethics and Economy  
12 
Economic science 
Economics as a science developed in the wake of the idea of the 
liberation of the individual combined with a scientific approach – ideas 
that had been so successful in natural science and engineering. We can 
imagine that the following question was asked: when I now have 
achieved the freedom to choose what I mean is to my own best, how 
can I then in the best possible way use the resources and technology 
available to obtain the best possible life? The attempts to answer this 
question, either in the role of producer or consumer, developed what is 
called ‘object rationality’, or also ‘means-end thinking’. The 
characteristic of this kind of rationality and way of thinking is that one 
starts with identifying goals and means, where the means normally have 
to be distributed towards several, alternative goals. Through this way of 
thinking a so-called instrumental knowledge developed, which is a 
knowledge that, after having identified goals and means, searches for 
how to obtain a maximum of the goals with the given means; or, 
alternatively, how to use a minimum of means to obtain a given goal. 
Such ‘means-end thinking’ is something we perform daily without 
reflecting much on it, and it is indispensable for managing everyday life. 
A textbook illustration that has often been used to demonstrate the 
paradigmatic issue in such instrumental, economic knowledge is Daniel 
Defoe’s novel Robinson Crusoe, about the man who was shipwrecked on a 
deserted island: given certain amounts of natural resources and his own 
manpower, how should Robinson spend his time between, respectively, 
producing means of production, consumption goods and ‘take out’ 
leisure time for consumption? 
On this background we may very well say that economic knowledge 
is ‘knowledge for utility and pleasure’. This is also supported by the 
school in philosophical ethics called utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is about 
maximising the welfare of individuals, and thereby also of society as a 
whole. It is usually associated with the formulation ‘a maximum of 
happiness for a maximum of people’. As an ethical theory, and 
especially suited as a super-structure for economic science, it has been 
based on mainly the works of the two British philosophers Jeremy 
Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-73). As opposed to 
Kant, who valued the inner, moral law of the individual, and thereby 
focused on the purpose of an act, utilitarianism values the consequences of 
an act, to oneself as well as to others. 
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Within economic knowledge efficiency has become a crucial value. 
Efficiency may be defined as absence of waste, that is, a situation where 
it is impossible to use the given resources differently in a way that gives 
a higher attainment of the particular goals. Which products give the 
highest satisfaction, and how there should be prioritisation between 
them – in other words, what is to be maximised – is up to the 
individual, free consumer to decide. This is done by letting each 
individual dispose of his or her own money, earned as income from his 
or her labour or capital, in a way that presumably gives him or her the 
maximum utility and pleasure. It is the market mechanism that takes 
care of the aggregation of all these individual choices to the best for all, 
that is, for society. Adam Smith (1723-1790), the founder of economic 
science compared this market mechanism with an ‘invisible hand’, 
actually discussing the preferences of merchants to direct their resources 
in support of domestic (rather than foreign) industry. 
Every individual… neither intends to promote the public interest, nor 
knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of 
domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; 
and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of 
the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in 
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was 
no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it 
was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes 
that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to 
promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected 
to trade for the public good. (Smith, 1976: 456) 
It is easy to imagine how this vision of a perfectly functioning market 
inspired people with a special interest in mathematics to put the entire 
market mechanism in a formula. This is also what was done, not long 
after Adam Smith proposed his theory. 
With regard to the common tasks of society, it became a common 
agreement within economic science that the government at least would 
have to decide on both the extent and the content of these common 
tasks. These decisions, however, would of course have to be made by a 
democratic political system. For the state authorities instrumental 
knowledge also became a useful tool. Methods were developed which 
could quantify total social utility and total social costs connected with 
possible public projects, such as road constructions, in order to rank all 
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alternative projects by the difference between utility and costs. The 
method for calculating social utility and cost values and how to 
aggregate them is in economic science known as cost-benefit analysis. 
From a social to a corporate perspective 
On exactly this question concerning the participation of the state in the 
economy, there have been great changes during the last twenty years. In 
November 1989 the Berlin Wall fell. This event marked the climax of a 
long-lasting process of an increasing discontent and resistance among 
the population in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union against 
inefficient and undemocratic state-governed regimes. This historical 
event had its parallel in the West, with small ‘Berlin Walls’ falling in a 
sequence of events. For some time there had in the West accumulated a 
certain dissatisfaction about, and a weakened trust in, a large state 
bureaucracy that did not manage to deliver the services which were 
expected from it, and in an efficient way. The expectations of the state 
to be a ‘super responsible’ supplier of welfare goods grew faster than its 
ability to meet these expectations. In each nation there grew an 
increasing support for a larger use of the market in society, a view that 
was expressed as an increased support for the political right (a 
movement that has been especially connected to the president of the 
USA from 1981 to 1989, Ronald Reagan, and the prime minister of 
Great Britain from 1979 to 1990, Margaret Thatcher), leading to so-
called ‘deregulations’ in several sectors, such as the energy sector. In the 
news media, the content of ‘economic knowledge’ became more 
business administration and less economics. Business schools took over 
much of the role of delivering premises for economic politics which 
earlier had been that of economics departments in universities. This 
change in roles also implied a change in the common understanding of 
economic knowledge. While economics primarily used to provide tools 
to governments for its various projects of modernisation at the national 
level, geared towards a quite complex goal of increasing the welfare of 
the population as a whole, business administration provides tools 
elaborated for a company in its more manageable efforts to obtain the 
largest possible gain for itself. The field of knowledge called ‘business 
management’ covers in fact much more than accounting and budgeting. 
It also includes marketing, organization theory, strategic management 
and other disciplines. A basic property of this change of perspective in 
the question of what is relevant economic knowledge is that while this 
Development of Economic Thought 
15 
knowledge was knowledge for the society; it has now increasingly 
become knowledge for the management of a corporation. What is seen 
as a relevant part of this knowledge is determined by what knowledge 
corporate management is expected to possess in order to make the 
decisions that are best for the corporation; that is, decisions that strike 
the right balance between expected costs and expected gains for the 
company, which primarily means the owners. This will be more clearly 
demonstrated in the next chapter, where we shall deal with the topic 
called ‘business ethics’. 
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2 
Business Ethics 
The increased market orientation 
In the previous chapter I mentioned how the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the collapse of the regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union led 
to changes also in the Western world: power was to a considerable 
extent transferred from nation states to private corporations. This 
transfer of power has led to an increased market orientation, resulting in a 
greater use of the market and correspondingly less use of government 
control in the production and allocation of goods and resources. This 
change is seen at all levels of society: 
1. Locally, such as when municipalities invite private companies to 
bid on their social services;  
2. Nationally, as when the provision of traditionally public goods is 
‘deregulated’, that is, more governed by the market (for instance, as 
in the energy sector);  
3. Globally, through the so-called ‘globalisation’ process. 
The increased market orientation has become subject to many political 
debates and strong criticism and scepticism, as has been expressed by 
organizations like ATTAC and other initiatives, often generated from a 
moral engagement on behalf of those who suffer the most from this 
process. Many people experience the changes as a harder working life, 
caused by still tougher competition, not only in the private sector, but in 
the public sector as well.  
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One reaction from society to this trend has been an increased focus 
on, and demand for, ethics in business. How should companies treat 
employees and business partners from other parts of the world from an 
ethical point of view? A greater focus on ethical values in business from 
outside has had negative effects on some companies. A bad reputation 
may have a devastating effect on the market performance of the 
company. Seen from a business management point of view, this is of 
course a problem, not primarily ethically, but even more so 
economically. Business leaders have asked themselves how such 
situations may be prevented, and they have started collecting and 
developing knowledge on this question. In this way the field of 
knowledge called ‘business management’ has come to include the topic 
called ‘business ethics’. This topic is a good example of how business 
management is able to absorb trends in society, in this case an increased 
interest in ethics, and through this absorption make it less threatening to 
business life itself.  
As a consequence of the demand on the business community, most 
of what is presented as ‘business ethics’ describes a rational 
accommodation within the logic and the goals of business management, 
based on the acknowledgement that if the company is to obtain its goals 
with respect to economic results, it needs to know its own surroundings 
and how the various players in the social environment will react to the 
decisions that are made. Such knowledge is necessary because in their 
surrounding there are media, organizations, competitors, customers and 
political groups who may be able to prevent the companies from 
obtaining their strategic and economic goals and in the worst case ruin 
their business. 
Some main topics in business ethics 
As with most other knowledge in the field of business administration, 
‘business ethics’ originated in the USA; however, a European version 
has developed over time. A more close reading of the literature, both 
the American and the European, though, leaves the reader with an 
unanswered question: Is ‘business ethics’ a knowledge of ‘ethics for 
business’ or is it a knowledge of ‘ethics in business’? A recently 
published book written with the ambition to present the European 
version of this ‘business ethics’ (Crane and Matten, 2004) opens by 
describing ethics as “the application of reason to elucidate specific rules 
and principles that determine right and wrong for any given situation. 
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These rules and principles are called ethical theories” (2004: 11). Such a 
description of ethics may be useful if what is needed is an ethics for 
business, as a part of instrumental knowledge, but at the same time it creates 
a need for knowledge about ethics in business, which we could define as 
incidents found in business being alternative to that of pursuing one’s 
self-interests. 
According to Crane and Matten the two main challenges in business 
ethics are problems related to: (1) globalisation, defined as “the 
progressive eroding of the relevance of territorial bases for social, 
economic, and political activities, processes, and relations” (2004: 16); 
and (2) sustainable development, which they define as challenges referring to 
“the long-term maintenance of systems according to environmental, 
economic and social considerations” (2004: 24). These two challenges 
become even clearer in the authors’ attempts to define a European 
version of business ethics, different from what is seen to be the US 
version. The European version of the subject is claimed to be less 
individually oriented and to a larger extent dealing with other agents 
than the company itself and its owners, such as local and national 
authorities  (and the European Union), labour movements and other 
stakeholders. Further, European business ethics is more concerned with 
social issues and negotiated frameworks, while ethics in the US is more 
concentrated on misconduct and immorality in single decision situations 
and also in more formal corporate codes of ethics (2004: 27-29). 
The question of what term is to be used to describe this knowledge 
has become an issue in itself. This is of course an important question, in 
terms of the description of reality as well as the social duties of a 
corporation. One reason for the continuously ongoing process of 
finding new words and terms is that people within business life have 
never been quite comfortable with terminology that has been created 
and used by others, outside business, such as academics or politicians. 
The very use of the term ‘business ethics’ and the increased attention it 
has received, may give the impression that this is something new, while 
business people will claim that this is not new at all, and that there is no 
reason that this should be focused on now more than before. Being 
confronted with the word ‘ethics’ by outside society may, for 
practitioners in business, be experienced as being ‘looked down on’. For 
this and other reasons new terms have been suggested, and one of those 
that has become widely accepted both inside and outside business is 
‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR). During recent years another term 
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has been suggested: ‘corporate citizenship’. This label tries to cover the 
most important part of business ethics, especially its European version. 
The term indicates that corporations have taken over tasks that were 
earlier assigned to governments (in accordance with the trend described 
in the previous chapter about the change from a national to a corporate 
perspective on the economy). This change is especially valid for the two 
main challenges mentioned above, globalisation and sustainable 
development. The term ‘corporate citizenship’ is also well suited for 
other properties of the European version of business ethics (see Crane 
and Matten, 2004: 62-63). 
It is also worth mentioning how business ethics (or whatever one 
chooses to call it) treats the various established ethical theories. Usually 
one chooses a rather pragmatic approach to these theories. Various 
ethical schools are often described, such as utilitarianism and 
Kantianism (which are both described shortly above), more or less as 
‘cafeteria concepts’: the reader, and the business leader, may choose the 
theory that fits best in each case. This is a part of the instrumental 
perspective of business management. The main interest of business 
leaders is to find tools that work, more than seeking the truth about 
humans and their views on right and wrong, in other words the question 
which originally occupied the authors of these theoretical contributions. 
With such an approach one could perhaps say that business ethics, in 
the sense of ‘ethics for business’, is ‘utilitarian’ in the sense of being 
utility-oriented in its choice amongst ethical theories. On the other 
hand, however, the question is whether such a choice is an ethical 
choice at all. In the end it is the interest of the company and not that of 
others which is in question. Such a self-centred perspective can hardly 
be viewed as ethical at all. This illustrates exactly the advantage of 
making the distinction between ‘ethics for business’ and ‘ethics in 
business’. The first is not an ethics (because it is for oneself) but instead 
a part of business administrative, instrumental knowledge, while the 
second (that is, ‘ethics in business’, which we will say more about later) 
is an ethics. The intriguing question we will discuss later is to what 
extent the latter can be presented as a knowledge. 
Another central issue in this field of knowledge with its many names 
concerns the roles, properties and importance of the different 
stakeholders of the company. Here we find a bundle of agents: 
shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, civil society and 
authorities, only to mention those that are closest. From an ethical 
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perspective, and especially from that which I will choose later, when I 
shall see how ethics, in the sense of the idea of the good, is put into 
practice, we can say that such discussions of the various stakeholders is 
a consequence of the problem that in practical life there are always more 
than one other to relate to. Put another way: at the moment the subject, 
in this case the corporate manager, acknowledges that there is not only 
one other to take care of (regardless who that may be), but more than 
one, i.e. a third, a fourth etc., then one has to start reflecting, analysing 
and searching for theories about what the differences are between them 
and how they are to be handled in the best way in accordance with their 
roles, their properties and their importance to one’s own company. 
What is a failure in business ethics? 
As mentioned in the previous chapter about business management as 
the new perspective in economic knowledge, it is expected that a 
business manager, with the tasks and the responsibility he is dedicated 
to meet, should make the right decisions, in the sense of performing the 
right evaluations of expected gains and costs for the company. The 
difference that may be caused by including ethical considerations in 
these evaluations does not change this: it implies only that how the 
company meets the ethical challenges from society has come in as added 
entries to the evaluation – both on the negative side, as reduced 
reputation and trust, and on the positive side, as improved reputation 
and trust. Regardless of what counts or not, the decisions made by 
managers always rest on weighing expected positive against negative 
consequences. Mistakes in such evaluations are not made because those 
who make them do not know ethics, but because they do not know 
their surroundings and their reactions sufficiently. From time to time 
issues appear in the news media where, for instance, top managers give 
themselves and each other high wage increases or other financial 
advantages. What appears as wrong in such cases is that these decisions 
are made in communities that are too closed, not allowing different 
views on the matter. 
There is an abundance of examples of such errors of judgement, in 
financial scandals, allegations or unveiling of corruption and excessive 
and demoralising wages or pensions to leaders, which all obviously turn 
out not to be to the best of the companies involved. It is important to 
notice, however, that within the perspective of business management 
knowledge, such cases become scandals not because there is a conflict 
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between economy and ethics. They become scandals because of the 
negative consequences they have for the company and the leaders 
involved. This can (as already pointed out) not even be called 
consequential ethics, as they do not consider the consequences for 
others in other ways than how these might lead to consequences for the 
company itself and its leaders. Such self-centred considerations cannot 
be regarded as any kind of ethics. The most important thing for the 
company, and for the business community, is that if the decision makers 
had had a sufficient knowledge of business management, including 
knowledge in ‘ethics for business’, which is also a kind of self-centred 
management, or, rather, if it had been possible to have such knowledge, 
there would have been no scandals. Within this frame of understanding 
there is always a right answer, a right strategy, which is both acceptable 
and suitable for the purpose, and consistent, and by consequence would 
have been sufficient to avoid any scandals. 
The ability of economic knowledge to justify itself 
Within the frame of understanding of economic knowledge, ‘failures’, as 
I have argued above, are caused by lacking knowledge about reactions 
from surroundings and not by a lack of knowledge of ethics. Viewed, 
however, from society outside the business community, such cases seem 
often to have their cause in the fact that decision makers consider the 
knowledge on which the decisions are based to be self-sufficient. 
Economic and management knowledge has a logical structure where 
everything has a cause and all unwanted consequences by principle can 
be avoided, if only sufficient knowledge is acquired. If one then does 
not consult others than those who operate within the same frame of 
understanding, the risk is high that it may go wrong.  
As is clearly discernible from the literature, and as can easily be 
expected, it is assumed of business ethics – in the sense of ethics for 
business – that it must be possible to understand, explain and justify a 
‘correct’ act. This is expected because economic and business 
management knowledge is equipped with a logical structure that can be 
understood as a feedback mechanism, sometimes described as a 
‘boomerang effect’: it will always pay to behave morally, because if one 
doesn’t, it will hit back at oneself and one’s company as reduced trust or 
a negative reputation. Cases of moral – or immoral – behaviour that do 
not have such a feedback effect are for this reason irrelevant. This is 
why ethics for business is an instrumental knowledge, as opposed to 
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ethics in business, which we may also find, but which is something else, 
to which we will return later. 
In economic theory the market is presented as a self-regulating 
mechanism. Ethical objections against a company may in the future 
harm the company, through giving it a bad reputation. Due to this 
feedback effect the management of the company will lay restrictions on 
themselves, to avoid negative corrections from outside. For instance a 
pharmaceutical company which is accused of bribing medical doctors 
with expensive dinners, travels etc., will by itself tone down such offers, 
because a bad reputation may harm the company. In other words, the 
instrumental knowledge we have here called ethics for business tries to 
find out just how far a company can push, before some reactions from 
outside will hit back at the company. 
One may of course ask the question whether such a self-regulating 
mechanism is sufficient, so that intervention from outside society will 
be unnecessary. On the other hand, such interventions may also be 
viewed as a part of a larger self-regulating mechanism: if the condition 
becomes sufficiently exposed to criticism, political action will be taken 
bringing the situation back in balance (perhaps also with the help of a 
scapegoat mechanism). In this way all theory about society may be 
considered as a logical, balanced and closed system where everything 
can be explained. But there is still one question that cannot be answered 
by this kind of theory in general, and by the theory of business and 
economics especially: where does the idea of the wrong being wrong 
come from? Or, to put it more positively: where does the idea of the 
good derive from? Why do people react to corruption, greed, 
accounting fraud and the exploitation of children and poor people? In 
other words: what is it that initially triggers the mechanisms in society 
which at the next turn cause companies to ask for more knowledge 
about ethics for business? The answer must be found in some universal 
human reactions that are not contained in conventional knowledge. 
There must be something in humanity which causes our negative 
reactions to such acts. Whether it comes from inside or outside the 
individual (or maybe from a combination of the two), in any case it 
comes from a place outside the logic of any self-regulating systems. This 
is why one can also speak about ‘ethics in business’, as a phenomenon 
taking place between people in organizations, but which does not fit the 
descriptions of ‘object rationality’ and instrumental knowledge. It is 
exactly this side of humanity that I try to trace in this book. 
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Business ‘ethics’ and ‘real’ ethics  
We have seen that what is called business ethics, in the sense of ethics 
for business, may be understood as part of the instrumental knowledge 
of business management. This does not necessarily mean, however, that 
this knowledge is irrelevant from a ‘real’ ethical point of view, nor that it 
merely serves window-dressing purposes. Business ethics (in the above 
sense) is in fact the only way ethical considerations can be represented 
within economic and instrumental management knowledge. Taken into 
account what impact this management knowledge has, and even more 
so all the activities that are based on such knowledge, it should be 
obvious that business ethics, even in this limited version of being ethics 
for business, is of great importance. Ethics for business describes – and 
prescribes – the way companies respond to ethical challenges in society, 
and thus constitutes a crucial part of the knowledge called business 
management. But still, this knowledge is something other than what we 
will later call ethics. 
Let me elaborate this point a little more through an analogy. Within 
the knowledge that business management has to acquire about society, 
one cannot presume that consumers are rational. Such an assumption 
could lead to decisions that do not benefit the company. Business 
managers realise quite early that consumers are led by irrational 
incidences and influences. In fact, such irrational incidences and 
influences are something the companies themselves may use to their 
own advantage, by appealing to it in their advertising. This knowledge 
about the ‘irrationality’ of consumers is analogous to the knowledge of 
business ethics: when a business manager takes ethical considerations 
into account before a decision is made, it is, as noted before, because 
such considerations are a part of the necessary knowledge about the 
society surrounding the company. To the company, ethics belongs to 
the category of ‘unexplainable behaviour of the surroundings’. It is 
exactly by acknowledging this that business management demands 
knowledge called ‘business ethics’ and ‘corporate social responsibility’. 
Such an ‘ethics’ has become rational knowledge about irrational society 
‘out there’. In other words, business ethics does not change the 
condition that forces the business manager to be self-centred, even if he 
or she, as a human being, may be far more multi-dimensional. Business 
ethics makes this difference even clearer. 
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Business ethics is about the necessity for a company to be 
responsive. That means two things: first, the company must be able to 
respond to demands from its surroundings in the way that is for the 
best of the company itself. Secondly, the company must also be able to 
predict how its surroundings will respond to the acts and words of the 
company, so that these acts and words will not harm the company, but 
may rather work to its advantage. 
In addition to such responsiveness, however, leaders may have 
another kind of responsiveness, involving themselves as humans. In the 
wake of the Enron scandal of accounting fraud in the USA, Harvard 
Business Review asked what actually characterises a good board, that is, a 
board where such scandals would have been stopped within the walls of 
the boardroom before they had become scandals. Sonnenfeld (2002) 
refers to an investigation (not surprising to many outside the business 
community) concluding that the companies who have shown that they 
can stop such processes before they become scandals have boards that 
are not primarily characterised by having much of what is considered 
business management knowledge (including business ethics), but which 
rather are characterised by creating a climate of trust and candour, 
fostering a culture of open dissent, treating no issue as undebatable. 
Investigations like this one point beyond business ethics as I have 
described it here. With such characteristics I am approaching what I 
have called ethics in business, the kind of ethics I am searching for in 
this book. 
The two questions revisited 
In my introduction I chose two questions as my selection of perspective 
for this book: 
1. From where does the idea that it is possible to do otherwise than 
privileging oneself over others come?  
2. This idea, which we may call ‘the idea of the good’, or, as we will 
call it here, ethics, how is it transformed into practical conduct? 
In other words, instead of the most common approach to ethical 
questions, which is to ask why ethical failures occur, we ask why they 
don’t occur more often. That is, instead of taking the side of the good 
and making the bad into my object of study, I take the opposite stance: 
Ethics and Economy  
26 
starting from common business logic and from the common human 
tendency to always seek to preserve one’s self-interest, I have focused 
on the daily phenomenon that people in general, and business managers 
especially, resist the temptation to always maximise gains for themselves 
or their companies. This perspective also helps to keep us away from 
what we may call ‘the moralistic trap’ that can also quite frequently be 
observed in ethical discussion and literature. The moralistic trap is to 
place oneself on the side of the good, observing and describing ‘the 
others’, those who ‘fail’, whether it is business leaders or other people 
‘out there’. It is a moralistic trap because it places oneself on an ethically 
higher level than the others, and thus it is ethically biased already from 
the outset. 
How easy it is to fall into the moralistic trap, and the question of 
how it can be avoided can only be understood properly by addressing 
more thoroughly the matter of subjectivity. We all look at the world from 
our subjective perspective. The consequences of this recognition have 
been discussed in various ways, and the position of objectivism has 
been, and still is, gradually replaced by different kinds of subjective 
perspectives. In ethics however, a tradition of objectivism is still the 
most common, holding some ideals as universal and objectively true. 
From a subjective perspective, one will soon realise that from this 
position one is actually looking down on ‘the others’, to those who are 
the object of one’s study. By the end of this book I hope to be able to 
highlight the full consequence of subjectivism also in ethics (without 
ending in relativism). Before coming to that, however, I shall say 
something more about subjectivity, especially within the realm of 
understanding. 
 SUBJECTIVITY 
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The Subjectivity of Understanding 
What does it mean to understand something? 
Imagine that you have recently been employed as the financial manager 
of a hospital. Your background is an MBA (master in business 
administration), you have earlier worked as financial manager in a 
private company, but you have no experience in the health sector. The 
first thing you want to do in your new job is to get an insight into what 
is particular about the activity of a hospital. You visit all departments 
and you meet representatives from the great number of professions 
found in a hospital: doctors, nurses, physiotherapists, bioengineers, 
psychologists, social workers, educationalists, computer engineers, 
administrative personnel, drivers, porters, janitors, etc. etc. In order to 
be able to be a good financial manager in such an organization, you 
want to understand the system you are going to work in. But what does it 
actually mean to understand something? And even more specifically: 
what are the consequences of the fact that what you want to understand 
is something that you, being a part of management, are going to lead, 
and that you are not going to be led by others? How should you, for 
instance, approach big and powerful groups of professions, such as the 
doctors, or big and influential unions, such as that of the nurses? 
To understand something in this sense, that is, from a managerial 
perspective, implies among other things that you will be using language 
to ‘capture’ your surroundings in order to relate all that is new to 
concepts you already know. Learning is to relate what is new and 
unknown to something that one already knows, and your references will 
be either your education or your earlier work experience. You will, for 
instance, find it both practical and illuminating from your perspective to 
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consider patients as a kind of ‘users’, or maybe even ‘customers’, while 
within the organization you will discover a strong resistance from health 
personnel against such terms. They will probably react negatively to this 
because in their view such terms ignore the patients as humans. 
(Economists and business people, who really want to provoke health 
personnel and at the same time expose the limits of their own 
knowledge, may call the patients ‘cost units’.) You will of course not 
deny that patients are humans, but in your economic assessments you 
find it both practical and illuminating to regard them primarily as the 
users of the services of the hospital, in the same way as customers in 
any company in the service industry. What you are doing is to attach 
something that from the outset is ‘quite different’ from everything you 
know, to something that you already know so that you can conceive it as 
‘the same as’ something you already know. The word ‘conceive’ comes 
from the Latin word concipere which means ‘to take in’. It is a 
combination of the prefix com- and the word capere, meaning to take or 
capture (see The Oxford Dictionary of Word Histories). In order to make 
something a part of your own understanding of the world, you must 
‘capture’ it and make it a part of your already existing understanding. 
Your understanding of reality is your understanding of reality; it cannot be 
someone else’s. In the centre of this understanding of reality are you, 
capturing your surroundings with the help of concepts. The purpose of 
elaborating so much on this here is to make clear that any 
understanding of reality, and especially an understanding having as its 
purpose to manage what is to be understood, has to be self-centred. To 
say that as a financial manager your understanding of the hospital is self-
centred may suggest negative associations. But it is neither meant here 
as something negative, nor as being morally blameworthy. Your 
understanding must be self-centred; that is just what I have tried to 
explain above. But at the same time this also means that such an 
understanding, just because it is self-centred, has its limitations. 
Thoughts and acts that are the opposite of self-centred, which we 
commonly call ethical, and which are important for health personnel 
when they insist that one must not forget that patients are also human 
beings, will fall outside of such a self-centred understanding. To the 
extent that management knowledge is object-rational, it must be of a 
kind that is both understandable and suitable for its purpose, and thus it 
must be for ‘my’ sake, in ‘my’ world, with ‘my’ managerial goals – while 
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ethics remains as an idea external to this understanding and knowledge, 
as unintelligible, because it exists for the sake of the other. 
A good illustration of this limitation of management knowledge 
caused by its self-centredness is the discussion that followed when one 
of the most famous advocates for a liberal market economy, Milton 
Friedman at the University of Chicago, in 1970 wrote that “the social 
responsibility of business is to increase its profits” (Friedman, 1970). 
His argument was that it is as humans that we take care of our fellow 
humans, while business firms are not humans and their task in society is 
to produce as efficiently as possible. The role of a business manager is 
to serve the owners of the firm, who have appointed him or her and 
who can also fire him or her. Social tasks are for the state and volunteer 
organizations – and for everyone else as long as they don’t do it at work. 
This argumentation by Friedman launched a lively dispute on corporate 
social responsibility, and it has been a useful discussion in the sense that 
it has contributed to clarify concepts and made it easier to ‘reveal’ false 
statements about corporative ethics and responsibility. On the basis of 
what has been said earlier in this book it is easy to understand why 
business managers think like Friedman. Much of what is said and 
written about ethics in business easily becomes nothing but window-
dressing. This still does not, however, prevent ethics in business, that is, 
acts of setting others before oneself, from occuring. In such cases the 
behaviour of companies may change, and then the company goes 
beyond Friedman’s description of its social responsibility. 
The idea that instrumental knowledge such as knowledge in 
management is self-centred, in the sense that each one is the centre of 
one’s own universe of knowledge, may to some be an unusual thought. 
However, this idea is not new: it has in various forms been a part of the 
theory of knowledge ever since ancient Greece. Still, many seem to be 
trapped in the idea that one, through knowledge, may obtain direct 
access to an objective, universal truth, which exists independently of the 
subject possessing such knowledge. Within the natural sciences, this 
idea will for most people pose no serious problem; it is only in quantum 
physics and in the philosophy of the foundations of science that one 
must be careful in assuming that scientific knowledge exists 
independently of the subject who observes nature and possesses that 
knowledge. In human and social sciences, however, it has for a long 
time been acknowledged that all knowledge depends on the ‘eyes that 
see’ and that it is not without problems to elevate one subjective 
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understanding to a level more true than others. In these sciences we 
observe that one has left the perspective of objectivism and instead 
acknowledged that one will have to deal with one or another kind of 
subjectivism. There are in particular three subjectivistic perspectives that 
should be mentioned: 
1. The sciences of languages and literature deal with understanding texts 
that already exist. But what does it actually mean to understand a 
text? To answer this question one has in these sciences developed 
what is called a hermeneutic method. This can be viewed as a circle: 
when first meeting a text everyone has a pre-understanding of it. 
This pre-understanding is gradually adjusted, by entering the depth 
of the text, then studying all connections (the context) in which the 
text has come into being,  then returning to the text itself, etc. By 
this method the understanding of the text is continuously corrected 
in accordance with what at any time is the existing knowledge, in 
communication with others. The hermeneutic method is related to 
the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002). 
2. Psychiatry and psychology is primarily about understanding individuals 
in mental crises, with the committed purpose to help them. The 
different kinds of crises have been given different names, 
determined by the symptoms and attempts at their explanations, 
such as anxiety, depression and schizophrenia. There are several 
schools within these fields, partly competing with, partly 
supplementing each other. Some are closer to somatic medicine than 
others, with their instrumental approach and method, based on the 
dyadic concepts of diagnosis and treatment. Those who are not, but 
who still direct their attention to the individual in their attempts to 
understand mental diseases, realise that these sufferings lie latent in 
all humans, with the difference that those who get ill don’t have the 
same protective mechanisms that others do. For these people 
mental diseases may be provoked by their discovering the dark and 
frightening sides of being a human. For instance, experiencing 
individual freedom may have a frightening and paralysing effect. To 
others everything in life may appear as indifferent and meaningless, 
and they thus enter an existential crisis. The discourse about what it 
means to be and live as a human, elaborating further on these 
questions as something common rather than pathological, is called 
existential philosophy. The most prominent contributors to this 
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philosophy is the Danish philosopher and religious thinker Søren 
Kierkegaard (1813-1855) and the French philosopher and author 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). 
3. The social sciences try to achieve a common understanding of how 
society functions. However, one cannot have any hope to find out 
how society actually is; such a truth is not accessible to anyone 
(more than to others). The only possible option is to try to describe 
how social reality appears to the observing, thinking and describing 
subject. Language and knowledge will thus have to rest on a 
hypothesis about intersubjectivity, that is, a hypothesis – which will 
forever remain such – that we in general have a common 
understanding of the reality in which we are living and working and 
which we describe and refer to in exchange with each other. This 
way of approaching social reality is called phenomenology, as it is the 
phenomena, as they appear, that are described. The most prominent 
persons in the development of phenomenology are the German 
philosophers Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Martin Heidegger 
(1889-1976). A third one, who was a student of both of these two, 
and with whom the reader will be further acquainted later, is the 
French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995). 
There is thus no such thing as a neutral and non-subjective description 
of society. Or, to be more precise: an attempt to make a neutral and 
non-subjective description of society would in the best case only be an 
unstructured and completely unintelligible mess of data, in other words 
an un-worked projection of reality itself. When we impose a structure 
on a description, in order to understand it, we also impose a purpose, or 
some other kind of assessment, on it. We all know very well how we, 
when watching a movie or reading a book, try to distinguish as early as 
possible, in order to understand the plot, the ‘good guys’ from the ‘bad 
guys’. A really good story, however, will challenge these efforts of ours, 
and by that mirror real life: people are both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and life is 
not as simple as we often want it to be. All ‘ordinary knowledge’ is in a 
certain sense normative, whether this is expressed explicitly or hidden 
implicitly behind a purely descriptive presentation. Even what is called 
‘descriptive theory’ is normative in the sense that it always, but often 
implicitly, has a purpose, so that one can have any possibility to 
understand what it is about. In the same way as we want to know who 
are the ‘good guys’ and who are the ‘bad guys’, any explanation of a 
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phenomenon – as theory is – in order to be understandable, is directed 
towards a desired goal: in medical knowledge there is an implicit or 
explicit value in saying that it is better to be healthy than sick. In 
economic knowledge there is, in a similar way, a value appraising 
economic development rather than economic stagnation. In 
technological knowledge there is an implicit value towards the 
innovations that promote human welfare more than those who don’t, 
and also a value saying that a successful project is better than an 
unsuccessful one. 
But then we may ask: if there is no objective, neutral knowledge, 
what is it then that decides what knowledge is? An answer to this 
question has been suggested by Thomas Kuhn (1970), an answer that 
has later been regarded as valid knowledge (in other words, his answer 
contains his own criteria). Kuhn described how knowledge develops in 
a social community of researchers, where new discoveries are adopted 
to existing knowledge as long as that is possible. When this is no longer 
the case, there is a ‘scientific revolution’. But before coming that far, a 
lot of knowledge is neglected because it does not fit in with the existing, 
conventional knowledge, or what he called the existing paradigm. What 
version of the truth ‘wins’ may depend on several conditions, such as 
which explanation has most political power on its side and which has 
the strongest power of explanation. (This is, naturally enough, an 
important point made by many feminist thinkers). Anyway, in one way 
or another we are talking about various forms of subjective, that is, self-
centred, knowledge.  
Normative knowledge, such as for instance a managerial, 
instrumental knowledge, also seems to have another limitation in 
addition to being self-centred. The freedom, the desire from which this 
knowledge once originated, seems to have been narrowed down rather 
than enlarged. What happens when we follow an instrumental 
knowledge seems to be that we are caught in a closed, self-explanatory 
logic ending up with one, ‘right’ solution. Let me elaborate a bit on this 
phenomenon. Gregory Bateson showed that the theory of evolution in 
biology also can enlighten the way we think. One of his formulations 
says that an explanation is “a mapping of a description onto tautology” 
(Bateson, 2002: 77). With this he meant that a description of something 
is given a meaning by us and can be explained only when we by help of 
our reason have imposed a logical structure upon it. A ‘tautology’ is a 
logical structure that is self-evident, which means some way or another 
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to say that A = A. The logical structure of an explanation is not there 
initially, that is, from nature’s side; it is we humans who ‘map’ the 
description onto a tautology, so that we can get the problem ‘solved’ 
and by that understand and explain what we have seen. 
Embedded in all knowledge is a logical structure which we don’t 
always see, but which always hides the conclusion behind the premises. 
That does not mean that the world is deterministic, but rather that we in 
our choice of understanding and explanations make it appear so. 
Because of this, there is a possibility that any instrumental knowledge, 
or, if one wishes, any ‘school knowledge’ may be predictable; it becomes 
closed and excluding towards what doesn’t fit in, that which is different. 
It develops to become an academic and intellectual language game and 
thus easily becomes boring to those who don’t already participate (as, 
for instance, new students or people from ‘practical life’). 
Later I will discuss more closely how knowledge can be ‘saved’ from 
being reduced into an internal language game. But before saying more 
about this, I will conclude so far by stating that instrumental knowledge, 
such as management knowledge, is characterised by the following three 
properties: 
a. it is normative, that is, it has a purpose; it is directed (from the 
subject possessing it and his self-centredness) towards something 
the subject wants to obtain; 
b. it is conventional, that is, it is commonly widespread, as a substitute 
for the ‘scientifically proven’, objective truth, after objectivism has 
been replaced by some kind of subjectivism; and 
c. it is explainable, that is, in order to be able to explain what is 
described, it must be logically consistent. 
The development of what is held as valid knowledge described above, 
viewed as a counterpart to what we here call ‘ethics’, may also be 
described as an expression of the duality of concepts and events. All 
knowledge is directed towards saying something about concepts, valid 
for and containing more than one singular event: from singular events 
we want to deduce something that is valid for all phenomena belonging 
to the same concept. By doing so we are forced to make equal singular 
events that cannot be equal, as they are different events, and this is done 
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by the use of language. The same terms and explanations are applied to 
different events; it is through this that they obtain their meaning and it is 
through this that we obtain knowledge about what is. The problem is 
that life still consists of singular events where two events are never quite 
equal. By putting singular events together in concepts, what is unique in 
each singularity will become invisible; some of the circumstances of the 
event will disappear as the event is reduced to the same as another event 
within the same concept. This applies also to the uniqueness of a 
person. Language will always categorise the other, reducing him or her 
into an object, being the same as others covered by the same concepts. 
Thus, already in the idea and the calling of attention to what is, there is a 
violation, if it is about another person. To see the other as unique, 
different from everything (and everyone) else, will thus fall outside every 
linguistic category, where everything is always identified as the same as 
something else. To see the other as unique will thus belong outside, or 
more precisely, will be prior to, such categorisations, and thus also prior 
to any language, and by that also prior to what we by help of language 
express as what is. This became, as I will show later, a decisive insight 
for Levinas. 
Postmodernity 
Are the three properties listed above valid for all kinds of knowledge? 
Some would probably not agree to that; however, what we in any case 
can observe is a tendency towards a situation where knowledge of any 
kind is forced to justify itself, by fulfilling the three criteria above. First, 
‘what is the purpose?’ is asked by parents, students, politicians and 
others who pay for education. Secondly, it is required that an 
understanding of something be conventional, if not it will not ‘function 
appropriately’ among other people. Finally, it is expected that all 
knowledge has a logical structure, if not it will only be a description that 
cannot be understood. (It could be, of course, so-called ‘narrative 
knowledge’, but such knowledge must also have a certain built-in logic 
to be understood; this logic is only less explicit). This tendency in the 
development of knowledge is of course closely related to the fact that 
knowledge is becoming a market commodity more and more in 
demand, and this fact feeds back into the development of knowledge 
itself. It is easy to find examples of this: in medicine, knowledge is 
driven less by the concern of what is best for the patient, and more by 
economic interests, which are paramount in the pharmaceutical industry 
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as well as in the health sector, which are subject to continuous pressure 
to gain profits and to cut costs. Even the knowledge called ‘ethics’ has 
moved, from being primarily a humanistic discipline about what it 
means to be a human being, to becoming a required professional and 
business ethics, expected to be a useful tool for professionals, for 
industry and for public authorities. 
To pursue this topic any further would go beyond the scope of this 
book. But at least we can observe that what seems to happen with 
knowledge of any kind today is that it is being confined by still stronger 
requirements towards fulfilling the three criteria above. (Just one 
indication of this development is the increasing interest in education in 
business management and the expectations connected to this 
knowledge, both from students and employers. These rising 
expectations towards personnel with education in business 
management, may in many ways remind us of the rising expectations 
towards state agencies in the 1970s and 80s both in the East and West, 
which culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall, as noted in an earlier 
chapter). 
Within the academic world there is a growing concern for an 
increasing commercialisation of knowledge. This is part of the market 
orientation we have earlier noted as an ongoing process in society. 
Knowledge becomes more subject to market conditions, towards a 
knowledge for the subject itself, about how, on behalf of oneself or 
one’s company one is going to ‘make it’ in a society becoming more and 
more subject to market conditions, not only in the private but in the 
government sector as well. 
So we observe, both in research, that is, in the development of 
knowledge, and in education, that is, in the dissemination of knowledge, 
that the quality criteria for knowledge are more and more determined by 
fluctuating market values. This development may indicate that 
knowledge – and by that also the concept of knowledge – is unstable, 
that it is in a state of unrest, maybe in a process of dissolution. One may 
experience that the fixed, hidden truth and deeper meaning slips. 
Concepts like truth and meaning seem to be regarded by an increasing 
number as both unnecessary and old-fashioned. Instead, it is more and 
more language that keeps knowledge together. Research and education 
resembles to an increasing degree a language game in which one is 
invited to participate, and in which one is forced to participate if one 
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doesn’t want to be excluded from social communities. ‘The grand 
narrative’ about our society is fragmented into small and singular 
narratives, isolated from each other. Anything can be explained and 
defended, if one is sufficiently clever in using words (and in particular if 
one masters the language game within science consisting of ‘method’ for 
its own sake). But through this change, paradoxically enough, 
knowledge also loses its power of explanation. The purpose of 
knowledge is to be able to find identities and by that to draw 
differences, using language and concepts. But when every use of 
language becomes a game where everything can be explained, 
differences will disappear. This is what the French philosopher Jean-
François Lyotard (1984) has called ‘the postmodern condition’. When 
applying such a critical approach to knowledge production, much of the 
produced knowledge may easily appear as boring and internal. It 
engages only those who already themselves participate in the language 
games. 
Preliminary conclusion 
Business ethics (in the sense of ethics for business) belongs to the field 
of management knowledge. But at the same time it is also a good 
illustration of the limits of this knowledge. Ideally there is one right 
solution which is given by the embedded logic and given premises. 
Instrumental knowledge alone can thus not come up with new and 
creative solutions. For such solutions maybe what is needed is 
knowledge that is neither normative, nor conventional, nor explicable – 
whether it is at all possible to imagine such knowledge. As an example, 
we may observe what happens when ‘innovation’ and ‘entrepreneurship’ 
have become independent topics in business management knowledge 
(as it is realised that in these activities lies an important source of higher 
profits). These topics represent at first something unknown and 
different, which one then tries to conceive. The problem with this 
knowledge, however, is that through the conception the unpredictability 
of these phenomena, which is exactly their most important property, 
vanishes. What is unknown and different is made into ‘the same as’ 
something that is known. In the final stage knowledge about innovation 
and entrepreneurship is made normative, conventional and explicable. 
Then one has to start over again, developing new concepts and so on, in 
an infinite sequence of new words and terms. At the moment 
something is captured by concepts it ‘freezes’, and we must start afresh 
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with new concepts in our futile attempts to capture the living and the 
unpredictable that always changes the existing. 
On this basis economic science can be said to have a retrospective 
base of knowledge (actually this applies to all knowledge; it is just more 
evident in economics than most other disciplines): ‘classical’ economics, 
as it was established by Adam Smith by the end of the 1700s (see 
chapter 1) and which was further developed into what is today called 
‘microeconomics’, shows how any given situation can be described as an 
equilibrium, as the only possible one, given certain conditions. ‘Modern’ 
economics, as it was established by John M. Keynes (1883-1946), and 
which has been further developed into what is today called 
‘macroeconomics’, chooses as its point of departure the forms of 
accounting and the equations that must be in force in any practice of 
accounting. Both these directions in economic science thus take their 
point of departure in something that already exists, or something that 
has already taken place. In this sense we may say that the knowledge to 
which they belong is retrospective. 
We noted earlier that at the historical roots of economic knowledge 
there was a considerable desire for individual freedom. Today this 
freedom is again asked for. The question is raised where the freedom 
that was initially the driving force in the development of economic 
knowledge has gone. People feel trapped in an economic logic giving 
them but one ‘choice’, and thus no real choice at all; a ‘choice’ 
consisting of joining the ‘merry-go-round’ as much as one can both in 
work life and as consumers, to many people at the cost of their well-
being and even health. But if economic knowledge shows us only one 
‘right’ solution, what are the alternatives? On the other hand, there does 
not appear to be any alternative economic system to choose. 
Paradoxically enough then, maybe ethics, as an idea of being and acting, 
not for one’s own sake but for that of some other, may recreate 
freedom? Maybe it is because its foundation is more ‘true’, because 
ethics comes prior to logical, and thereby deterministic, language? 
To Levinas both freedom and the dream of freedom is something 
that is experienced within the frame of the restraint implied in being 
responsible for the other. Maybe market liberalism is about to make the 
same unfortunate experiences as totalitarian regimes made earlier? In 
both cases it started with a desire for freedom but ended in the 
opposite, as freedom was gradually institutionalised. Freedom is 
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corrupted by our need to understand and to make everything fit into 
universal and logical categories. The challenge is not to be captured by 
this need, but instead to keep the unique, not at least the uniqueness in 
each individual. This will probably require transcending market 
liberalism, just as it previously required transcending totalitarianism. 
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The Subjectivity of Literature 
Peer Gynt: To be oneself enough 
Concerning the field of business ethics I have earlier in this book drawn 
a distinction between, on the one hand, ethics for business, which is the 
dominating perspective since having become an integrated part of the 
instrumental knowledge of business management, and, on the other 
hand, ethics in business, as the occurrence of the idea that it is possible 
to set the other before myself, also within and between business 
organizations. One way of describing the difference is to say that ethics 
for business is a knowledge that business develops and applies for itself. 
As I have already mentiond, the question could be raised whether it is 
correct to call this ethics, in contrast to ethics in business, which, 
because it is an ethics, can only be applied and developed for the sake of 
the other. 
A good elaboration on the difference between that of being for 
oneself and being for the other, even applied to business activities, is 
provided by Henrik Ibsen in his play Peer Gynt (first published in 1867), 
in the first scene of the fourth act. 
This scene takes place on the south-west coast of Morocco. Peer 
Gynt, “a handsome, middle-aged gentleman in elegant travelling clothes, 
gold pince-nez dangling”, hosts four admiring men from England, 
France, Germany and Sweden, respectively. The scene opens by Peer 
calling for a toast for pleasure: “If man is made for pleasure, why should 
pleasure fret you?” The four guests praise and flatter Peer, after which 
Peer confesses that he has achieved wealth and success exclusively 
because he has only thought of ‘‘his’ and ‘he’’ and has also avoided 
marriage. The German guest wonders whether this ‘existence-self-
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projected’ hasn’t had any costs, to which Peer, sovereignly elevated 
above the actual course of events, tells how he almost got married to a 
girl ‘of royal family’ (who in fact was the daughter of the Mountain 
King), but that he escaped although it ‘cost blood’ (but as the reader and 
audience – but not the four guests – know from earlier in the play, it 
was a rather miserable affair). On the question from where he has got 
his cleverness, Peer boasts of his lack of intellectual training. He has not 
read much, only adopted what one can use, including religion (there can 
be little doubt that Ibsen here from his position in Central Europe at 
that time spoke ironically about the Norwegians), to which the 
Englishman, still admiring, replied “Now, that is practical!” 
Peer has also lived in the USA for some years and he tells how he 
has made his way to become a self-made man. He tells that he has earned 
good money from slave trade crossing the Atlantic and from the export 
of ‘heathen images’ to China (which at that time must have been 
considered a direct sabotage of the Christian mission and thus immoral, 
maybe even more so than the slave trade). Actually, it occurred to Peer 
that what he was doing was at the limit of the acceptable, but, on the 
other hand, it was difficult to wind up such a brilliant business, as 
It’s very hard, at any rate 
in business of such wide deployment, 
providing too, so much employment, 
quite out of hand to terminate. (Ibsen, 2007: 56) 
Peer lightened his consciousness by expanding the export of heathen 
images by also carrying missionaries and “provide them everything 
required, like stockings, bibles, rum and rice”, so that the “result was 
neutralised”. “But still for gain?” the Englishman asked, to which Peer 
replied: “I took my slice. It worked”. The business concept was 
ingenious: The more heathen images that were bought by the Chinese, 
the more to do for the missionaries. On the question from the 
Englishman of how it went with “Africa, those wares?” implicitly 
meaning the slaves, Peer answered: 
There, too, the triumph of my creed 
I saw the trade was rash indeed 
for people entering their fifties. 
One never knows how short one’s shrift is. 
On top of that, the thousand snares 
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set by our philanthropic crew, 
not counting piracy, then there’s 
the risk from wind and weather too. (Ibsen, 2007: 56-57) 
He ended up by buying some land in South America, “kept the final 
load of flesh, which, by the way, was top-grade, fresh”. His story further 
goes: 
They throve, filled out to such a measure 
it was, to them and me, a pleasure. 
Yes sir; without exaggeration 
I treated them as father, friend, – 
which paid its own fat dividend. 
Built schools, too, for the preservation 
of standards of morality 
throughout the whole community, 
and took good care, or I’d soon know it, 
its mercury never fell below it. 
Besides, I’ve stopped both kinds of action 
and pulled out of the business there; – 
I’ve sold the lot in one transaction, 
plantation, fixtures, hide and hair. 
The day I left, I had them come, 
the kids and grown-ups, for free rum; 
the adults all got tight as hell, 
the widows got some snuff as well. 
That’s why I hope that inasmuch 
as the saying isn’t just hot air: 
that “he who does no foul does fair” – 
my trespasses are past, as such, 
and, more than most, my faith’s worth pinning 
on virtues cancelling out the sinning. (Ibsen, 2007: 57) 
The German guest, clinking glass with Peer, exclaims: 
How bracing is a demonstration 
of principle in action, quite 
set free from theorising’s night 
unmoved by public condemnation! (ibid.) 
Peer then betrays his ‘business secret’, which he by the way shares with 
his Nordic friends, and which is always to “make sure that you leave a 
bridge to yield a route by which you can withdraw.” Besides, he has 
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always picked some knowledge here and some there, from all the 
countries he has visited. 
Peer is then asked by his guests what he will do with his wealth, 
since, as the Englishman puts it: “Who’d waste an hour on hoisting sail 
for sailing purely? Some sort of goal you must have, surely. And that 
goal is – ?” 
To this Peer discloses that his goal is to be emperor over the entire 
world. Only that can be the realisation of “the Gyntish Self”: 
The Gyntish self – It is that host 
of wants, desires that stir one most, – 
the Gyntish self, – it is a sea 
of whims and needs and urgency, 
whatever stirs my breast precisely, 
and thereby makes me live – concisely. 
But as our Lord has need of dust 
to ply his art as world-creator, 
even so for me, gold is a must 
if I’m to look the imperator. (Ibsen, 2007: 59) 
In order to obtain this goal, however, more gold is needed. And the 
latest idea of how to earn more money he got from that day’s 
newspaper. He there learned that the Greeks had revolted against their 
Turkish rulers, and from this Peer saw good opportunities to gain more 
wealth. At this point of the party a misunderstanding occurs between 
Peer and his guests. The guests believe that Peer is now entering the 
conflict on the side of the Greeks and that he anticipates a reward for 
this later. They become fully enthusiastic about this idea and they want 
to join him in the Greeks’ struggle for freedom, although with a 
personal motive of being rewarded, but still fighting for a good cause. 
They apologise to Peer for having suspected him of being cynical and as 
they now believe that he will stand on the side of the suppressed Greek 
people they give him all honour back. To this Peer first reacts with 
confusion, but then with indignation. Of course will he, Peer Gynt, not 
choose sides in the conflict. He wants to earn money from the war in 
the same way he earned money by combining the export of heathen 
images and missionaries to China: he will supply the Greeks with 
weapons and at the same time lend money to the Turks, so that the war 
can last as long as possible. He considers his guests to be quite stupid in 
not seeing this new ingenious business idea. At this moment he 
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therefore realises that it is time to break up from a pleasant evening, 
before it turns into the opposite. But before he leaves he explains his 
position in the following way: 
When one’s dominions scarce exceed 
the strip one’s body shades, one’s rightly 
predestined to be cannon-feed. 
But if one’s raised above the mire, 
as I am, then one’s stake is higher. 
You go to Hellas. I’ll supply you 
arms and transportation, free. 
The more you stoke hostility 
the more I’ll gain and profit by you. 
Strike out for freedom and for right! 
You give it to the Turks! Go fight; – 
and end up, to admiring glances, 
impaled on Janissary lances. – 
Excuse me, though. (slaps pocket) 
I’m worth a mint, 
and I’m myself, Sir Peter Gynt. (Ibsen, 2007: 60-61) 
Left alone the four guests become somewhat irresolute. On the one 
hand, they see great opportunities for profits if they choose to fight on 
the Greek side and after an expected victory may gain their share in 
some of the plentiful natural resources of the country. The Englishman 
tells with great enthusiasm what he has heard about both the copper 
occurrences in the mountains and the energy of the water falls. But, on 
the other hand, if they don’t emerge victoriously from their engagement: 
but stuck there in the ranks 
we’ll drown amongst the mob – no thanks! 
And where’s the profit we should save? (Ibsen, 2007: 61) 
Finally, the German suggests that they drop this risky project of joining 
the Greek struggle for freedom and instead choose the far less risky 
enterprise of robbing Peer’s luxury yacht and steal all they may find of 
valuables there. The others hesitate a bit to get into this swindling, but 
finally they are led by the temptation of easy money. The whole act ends 
when also the Swede joins the others with the words: 
I have to join their operation, – 
but I protest to all creation –! (Ibsen, 2007: 62) 
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Considering the fact that this play was published in 1867 we may say 
that the issues in business ethics we have discussed earlier in this book 
are certainly not new.  
A theme throughout the whole play of Peer Gynt is that of ‘being 
oneself’ as opposed to that of ‘being oneself enough’. Peer was told the 
difference between these two by the old troll of the Dovre mountains 
(‘The Mountain King’), as we can see from the following dialogue in the 
second act: 
DOVRE 
What’s the distinction between troll and man? 
 
PEER 
So far as I know, there is none, by my score. 
The big want to roast you, the small ones to scratch you; – 
same as with us, if they dare but catch you. 
 
DOVRE 
True enough; we’re alike in that and more. 
But morning’s morning, and night is night 
so there are differences still, all right. – 
Now you must hear what those differences are: 
out there, ‘neath the shining vault of day, 
“Man, be thyself!” is what humans say. 
In here with us, between troll-folk, that guff 
is expressed as: “Troll, be thyself – enough!” 
 
ELDER (to Peer) 
Spot the profundity? 
 
PEER 
A bit hazy so far. (Ibsen, 2007: 33) 
In relation to what has earlier been discussed we could say that ‘to be 
oneself enough’ that is, to be like a troll, is to live and to develop and 
apply knowledge for oneself, while that of ‘being oneself’ is to be a human 
(and not a troll), where a decisive property of being a human is to 
encounter another human, that is, to be in an ethical relation. Dedicated 
to himself and his own life, Peer Gynt had obvious difficulties seeing 
this difference. One example of this was his reaction when his friends 
for a moment thought that he intended to join the Greeks in their 
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struggle for liberation, an attitude that many people would consider a 
consequence of being human. 
Later in the play, in the fifth act, Peer asks the figure called ‘the 
button-moulder’ what it means to be oneself, and the answer of the 
button-moulder is: “To be oneself is: onself to slay” (Ibsen, 2007: 112). 
This answer may appear both enigmatic and rather dramatic (and so is 
also the figure of the button-moulder). But it can be interpreted such 
that to be oneself is to set oneself in the background and let the other 
come forth. For a human to be oneself, as opposed to a troll who is 
himself enough, it will be to be for the other, that is, to renounce oneself. 
This demand may seem impossible to meet; on the other hand, it is in 
this being-for-the-other that Peer fails by being himself enough. I will 
return to these thoughts later, in the presentation and discussion of the 
philosophy of Levinas. 
Another example from the same play is the role of Solveig, who 
through many years waited for her Peer, and forgave him in spite of all 
his failures. From Solveig’s subjective perspective Peer had been exactly 
himself, as humans should be, because he had been a person for her. To 
Peer, Solveig was, at the same time, with her patience and 
unconditioned forgiveness, fundamentally ethical, in the sense of being 
an ‘I-for-the-other’. They had both been themselves (in contrast to being 
themselves enough) in the sense of being for the other. In other words, 
the Peer in the world of Solveig is a different Peer to the Peer who is 
described in Ibsen’s story. Again, we are moving towards Levinas who 
describes ethics as ‘otherwise than being’. Solveig does not judge Peer 
from a perspective of justice, she shows unlimited mercy, which is prior 
to any justice. Such interpretation of the end of the play is quite 
different from what it was the first time it was shown and also as it has 
been interpreted later: as a banal, hyper-romantic and misogynistic 
happy end. 
The Lady from the Sea: Freedom under  responsibility 
‘The Lady from the Sea’ is the nickname of Mrs. Ellida Wangel, who, as 
the daughter of a lighthouse keeper grew up by the open sea. Since then 
she has always longed for the open sea, a longing that is also connected 
to her longing for freedom. She is married to a medical doctor who is 
considerably older than herself, Dr. Wangel, and she lives with him at 
the inmost end of a long fjord in Norway, far from the open sea. When 
Dr. Wangel’s first wife died and he was left alone with two small 
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daughters, Dr. Wangel asked the young Ellida to marry him, a question 
which Ellida later reflected upon as if she did not have any choice. Just 
before this happened Ellida had a romantic affair with a seaman (by 
Ibsen called ‘the stranger’), but he had to escape back to the sea after 
having committed a murder. Some years later the seaman returns, as he 
had promised, and asks Ellida to come with him. Ellida feels a strong 
drive towards the stranger as she also has this drive towards the sea – 
and towards freedom. She falls into great torment and finally she asks 
her husband to give her the freedom to choose between him and the 
stranger. As the situation becomes increasingly tense, Dr. Wangel, who 
has been both her husband and doctor and considered himself also to 
be her protector, for the first time sees his wife as an independent 
human being. The dialogue then proceeds as follows, in the presence of 
the stranger: 
ELLIDA (with growing excitement) 
Wangel, let me tell you this – tell it you so that he may hear it. You can 
indeed keep me here! You have the means and the power to do it. And 
you intend to do it. But my mind – all my thoughts, all the longings and 
desires of my soul – these you cannot bind! These will rush and press 
out into the unknown that I was created for, and that you have kept 
from me! 
 
WANGEL (in quiet sorrow) 
I see it, Ellida. Step by step you are slipping from me. The craving for 
the boundless, the infinite, the unattainable will drive your soul into the 
darkness of night at last. 
 
ELLIDA 
Yes! I feel it hovering over me like black noiseless wings. 
 
WANGEL 
It shall not come to that. No other deliverance is possible for you. I at 
least can see no other. And so – so I cry off our bargain at once. Now 
you can choose your own path in perfect – perfect freedom. 
 
ELLIDA (stares at him a while as if stricken dumb) 
Is it true – true what you say? Do you mean that – mean it with all your 
heart? 
 
WANGEL 
Yes – with all my sorrowing heart – I mean it. 
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ELLIDA 
And can you do it? Can you let it be so? 
 
WANGEL 
Yes, I can. Because I love you so dearly. 
 
ELLIDA (in a low, trembling voice) 
And have I come so near – so close to you? 
 
WANGEL 
The years and the living together have done that. 
 
ELLIDA (clasping her hands together) 
And I – who so little understood this! 
 
WANGEL 
Your thoughts went elsewhere. And now – now you are completely free 
of me and mine – and – and mine. Now your own true life may resume 
its real bent again, for now you can choose in freedom, and on your 
own responsibility, Ellida. 
 
ELLIDA (clasps her head with her hands, and stares at WANGEL) 
In freedom, and on my own responsibility! Responsibility, too? That 
changes everything. 
 
(The ship bell rings again.) 
 
THE STRANGER 
Do you hear, Ellida? It has rung now for the last time. Come. 
 
ELLIDA (turns towards him, looks firmly at him, and speaks in a 
resolute voice) 
I shall never go with you after this! 
 
THE STRANGER 
You will not! 
 
ELLIDA (clinging to WANGEL) 
I shall never go away from you after this. 
 
THE STRANGER 
So it is over? 
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ELLIDA 
Yes. Over for all time. 
 
THE STRANGER 
I see. There is something here stronger than my will. 
 
ELLIDA 
Your will has not a shadow of power over me any longer. To me you 
are as one dead – who has come home from the sea, and who returns to 
it again. I no longer dread you. And I am no longer drawn to you. 
 
THE STRANGER 
Goodbye, Mrs. Wangel! (He swings himself over the fence.) 
Henceforth, you are nothing but a shipwreck in my life that I have tided 
over. (He goes out.) 
 
WANGEL (looks at her for a while) 
Ellida, your mind is like the sea – it has ebb and flow. Whence came the 
change? 
 
ELLIDA 
Ah! Don’t you understand that the change came – was bound to come 
when I could choose in freedom? 
 
WANGEL 
And the unknown? – It no longer lures you? 
 
ELLIDA 
Neither lures nor frightens me. I could have seen it – gone out into it, if 
only I myself had willed it. I could have chosen it. And that is why I 
could also renounce it. 
 
WANGEL 
I begin to understand little by little. You think and conceive in pictures 
– in visible figures. Your longing and aching for the sea, your attraction 
towards this strange man, these were the expression of an awakening 
and growing desire for freedom; nothing else. 
 
ELLIDA 
I don’t know about that. But you have been a good physician for me. 
You found, and you dared to use the right remedy – the only one that 
could help me. 
 
WANGEL 
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Yes, in utmost need and danger we doctors dare much. And now you 
are coming back to me again, Ellida? 
 
ELLIDA 
Yes, dear, faithful Wangel – now I am coming back to you again. Now I 
can. For now I come to you freely, and on my own responsibility. 
 
WANGEL (looks lovingly at her) 
Ellida! Ellida! To think that now we can live wholly for one another –  
 
ELLIDA 
And with common memories. Yours, as well as mine. 
 
WANGEL 
Yes, indeed, dear. 
 
ELLIDA 
And for our children, Wangel? 
 
WANGEL 
You call them ours! 
 
ELLIDA 
They who are not mine yet, but whom I shall win. 
 
WANGEL 
Ours! (Gladly and quickly kisses her hands.) I cannot speak my thanks 
for those words! (Ibsen, 2001: n.p.) 
In the Norwegian original text Ibsen in this scene uses the words ‘frihet 
under ansvar’ (freedom ‘under’ responsibility). In English translations this 
is usually rendered as the more common expression ‘freedom on your 
own responsibility’, which easily can be interpreted in the way that the 
only restriction on Ellida’s freedom is the fact that she is the one 
responsible for whatever consequences her conduct may have for 
herself: she cannot blame others. But when Ibsen here uses the words 
‘freedom under responsibility’ and especially in the context given in this 
scene, there can be no doubt that he means more than being 
responsible for consequences to oneself: my freedom is also restricted 
by my responsibility for the other(s). Ellida’s decision to stay with her 
husband was voluntary, as she demanded from him that it should be 
(this time), but it was at the same time, as he appealed to her, a decision 
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taken in a freedom emerging from her responsibility, not only towards 
herself and her own life, that is, not a freedom from responsibility (a 
freedom that Ibsen lets the stranger represent), but instead a decision 
made as a response to responsibility for the other, that is, for her husband 
and his children, her stepchildren. 
This semantic change from the original Norwegian text to the 
English translation may also be interpreted as symptomatic for what has 
happened to the concept of freedom during the years between 1888 and 
now, and maybe even more as an illustration of the difference between 
a European continental and Anglo-American understanding of freedom. 
With his ‘freedom under responsibility’ Ibsen here clearly represents a 
Kantian, and by that a continental, view on individual freedom, where it 
is assumed that the moral law, and with it the responsibility for the 
other, is prior to laws and rights, while the common English translation 
may reflect the economic concept of freedom which, in contrast to 
continental, Kantian philosophy is better suited to Anglo-American, 
utilitarian ethics where freedom means primarily freedom from 
responsibility, in the sense that the individual only needs to take account 
of the consequences his or her choice may have for him or herself; such 
as, for instance, any sanctions from society, being from the market, the 
legal system or other social institutions established with the purpose of 
liberating individuals from their responsibility for the other. Kant, and 
Ibsen, on the other hand, will claim that such social mechanisms can 
never free us from our responsibility for the other, as this responsibility 
is embedded in us initially, prior to both individual freedom and social 
institutions. 
 ETHICS
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Ethics of Care 
An example 
Let me now go back to the example from the introduction of chapter 3: 
Imagine that you are the financial manager of a hospital. The director 
has asked you to set up a proposal for a new budget for the hospital 
where expenditures have to be cut by a considerable amount of money 
compared to the current situation. In your proposal the nurses on 
several of the units of the hospital will be forced to work more 
efficiently, with fewer employees on duty at one time with the same 
number of patients. You have checked that this personnel reduction is 
possible within existing rules and national standards of what is medically 
defensible. The nursing personnel at several units, however, react 
vigorously to your proposal, as based on their professional and human 
considerations it will be ethically unjustifiable to the patients and their 
relatives. 
The head of the nurses in one of the units feels completely 
powerless when she is presented with the decision and the arguments 
from management. Her professional knowledge as a nurse is based on 
care for the patients. When you, as the financial manager of the hospital, 
have a quite different, and apparently ‘objective’ view, it seems 
impossible for her to get anywhere with her arguments. Even if much of 
her professional knowledge of nursing about what is good for the 
patients and the involvement of their relatives is regarded as ‘evidence-
based’, this is of little help to her against the arguments of the financial 
manager that budgets have to be held. Her professional knowledge rests 
ultimately on an ethical condition, which is good care for the patients, a 
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condition which, compared with ‘objective’ economic facts, is 
considered subjective. 
The general and the particular 
The occasion in the above example was a requirement of the hospital 
management for expenditure cuts, a requirement that to the nurses 
appeared ethically indefensible towards the patients and their relatives. 
This example describes one of several similar confrontations between 
two different perspectives both within and outside work-life: on the one 
hand, knowledge about general and economic relations, and, on the 
other, knowledge from experience with particular single events. In such 
confrontations the general perspective will usually come out stronger 
than the particular one, because it has language and logic on its side and 
with that also the definitions of what is. In special cases, however, the 
particular and unique may ‘break through’. Not only in hospital units 
but other places as well, also outside work life, a care is provided to 
others that cannot be explained by any kind of objective rationality, but 
that still everyone has experienced – and experiences daily – both as 
giver and receiver. These are occasions where the one giving care sets 
the other before himself or herself. These are not the cases where, based 
on instrumental knowledge, it is ‘smart’ to set the other first, as this will 
in the long run be to the best for oneself. The cases we are treating here 
are situations where one sets the other before oneself without reflecting 
upon it. Examples may be the nurse who, confronted with the needs of 
her patient, prioritises these before her own needs; it may be the teacher 
who prioritises the needs of her pupil before her own, and it could be 
the saleswoman who sets the needs of the customer before her own, 
not because she is told to do it by management, but as an immediate 
response to the encounter with her customer (for simplicity of 
expression I choose to refer to these professionals as ‘she’). This need 
to provide care for others may to some even be a motivation to go into 
the profession. Other reasons for joining several of these professions, 
and staying there, with high work pressure and not a very high salary 
compared to those of others even within the same organization, may be 
hard to find. 
If this providing of care, as it is described above, cannot be 
explained rationally in any way, it can still be described, without a logical 
and self-explaining structure, as we have earlier seen is the case with 
instrumental knowledge. When we in the following want to describe 
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ethics as an idea, it must be an idea that is not self-centred from the 
outset, but instead an idea proposing that it is possible to set the other 
first, not as a conclusion of some logical chain of thought, but instead as 
an alternative point of departure. 
In the professional ethics taught in health education this is already 
an established issue. The need for a more systematised ethics in these 
professions arises normally when one as a health worker is confronted 
with dilemmas caused by the impossibility of meeting the needs of 
everyone. In other words: professional ethics are developed from, 
among other things, experiences with what I here will call encounters 
with the third. At the moment the health worker is confronted with more 
than one who needs care – and sooner or later (rather sooner) he or she 
will – the health worker is forced to reflect, estimate and prioritise. This 
is often experienced – and described – as an ethical dilemma, because 
the encounter with each single other calls forth a responsibility to the 
health worker. This means that there is an ethics before the dilemma of 
professional ethics, dealing with what happens in the encounter with the 
other. This issue is treated by several authors, who are frequently referred 
to in the literature of professional ethics. Among these are Martin 
Buber, Emmanuel Levinas and Knud E. Løgstrup, who all three in 
different ways have expressed that being a human implies to relate to the 
other. To Buber (1987), being human is to enter the phenomenon of the 
I-Thou, as opposed to an I-it. To go into the I-Thou is a daring deed; one 
can never know what will come out of it; it is a risk that is connected to 
personal development. To Levinas (who will be presented in more detail 
in the next chapter), being human implies being an I-for-the-Other: having 
encountered the Other, I am, with all my knowledge, logic and 
predictability – all that makes me be me in the eyes of others – 
questioned. To Løgstrup (1997), a basic condition of being human is 
being ‘intertwined’ with the life of the other. From this fact I will always 
have a part of the other’s life in my hands, and from there follows the 
ethical demand to take care of the other. 
The personal experience of being confronted with the needs of the 
other gives rise to an ethical orientation that forms the base of 
professional knowledge – before any theoretical considerations are 
brought in, whether they are within ethics or economics. This ethical 
base may, however, come into conflict with a management perspective, 
which is, as we have seen, self-centred. For instance, there is an obvious 
difference concerning motivation: in health and social professions, the 
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drive towards helping others may be the most important factor of 
motivation, while in management thinking the main factor of 
motivation is economic gain for the individual employee. In the next 
chapter I will show how Levinas’ analysis of the encounter with the third 
can create a connection between these two factors of motivation, that is, 
between the ethical demand in the encounter with the other and the 
requirements of the economic system. 
Ethics of care 
In her book Care, with the subtitle A Feminine Approach to Ethics and 
Moral Education, Nel Noddings (1984) describes a mother’s care for her 
child as an initiating experience for the development of ethics. To her, 
care for one’s child is in the beginning not a question of morality or 
ethics; it is something inborn and natural. Morality comes later, and 
after that comes ethics, but they are both developed, according to 
Noddings, from natural care. A significant difference between this 
ethics of care and other, ‘conventional’ theories of ethics, is that while 
the traditional theories (such as those related to Kant, utilitarianism, 
etc.) start with autonomous individuals, the ethics of care starts with the 
relation between two persons, such as mother and child, or nurse and 
patient – in other words: between a care giver and a care receiver. The 
individual is defined by the relation: one becomes an individual through 
being in relations with others. 
Noddings emphasises further that the source of ethics is non-
rational. Here she refers to, among others, the child psychologist Urie 
Bronfenbrenner, who claimed that if children are to be able to develop, 
they will need a continuous irrational engagement from one or more 
adults in care and interaction. When Bronbenbrenner once was asked 
what he meant by ‘irrational’, he answered: “Somebody has got to be 
crazy about that kid!” (Noddings, 1984: 61). 
Noddings claims that ethics develops from care, and in her 
argumentation she exemplifies this describing a specific case (1984: 82-
84): when she as a mother wakes up at night from her infant’s crying, 
she gets up and does what she can for the child. This is not a moral 
choice; it is a quite natural reaction. A mother who neglects the needs of 
her child is not considered immoral, but rather sick or in a situation that 
makes her unable to function normally as a mother. To feed an infant, 
as a response to its expressions of hunger, is an impulse we share with 
animals. Noddings claims that this impulse to provide care develops 
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further in humans towards what we call ‘morality’. This implies that we 
do have a choice, but that to give care in such situations is more natural 
than not to give care. Not to give care to a person who expresses a need 
for it demands an explicit reason. It demands that one either deliberately 
denies a sense of belonging, or that one is deliberately changing an 
ethical standard, for instance out of some logic or rational reason. In 
this way we may say that the care a mother gives her infant, out of an 
inborn impulse, is the beginning of not only a more general care 
between people, but also a beginning of our ideas of what good and bad 
acts are between people, that is, morality, and by that, those reflections 
we make on morality, in other words what we call ‘ethics’. Thus, caring 
for the other comes first, before any rules and principles.  
Nodding says that the person who gives care is ‘obsessed’ by the 
other. To her, my care for the other comes before my own freedom. 
The freedom of the individual is thus conditioned by restrictions 
imposed by the other. Further, these restrictions on my freedom exist 
before, and not after, freedom itself is defined. 
Ethical dilemmas 
Nel Noddings is not the only author who has used the term ‘ethics of 
care’. As we have already mentioned, the ethics of care starts with the 
relation, and not the individual, as the basic building block in describing 
how people think, feel and act. One problem with this kind of ethics, 
based on the relation to the other, is that there is also a third, a fourth, 
etc., and as soon as I am forced to relate to these as well, I will become 
uncertain when it comes to what an ethics of care demands of my 
responsibility for the other. And in addition: shouldn’t I also take care 
of myself? Let us pursue this question one step further: an ethics of care 
has no way to deal with economic, administrative and organizational 
systems, where several considerations have to be made, not only ethical 
ones, but also ones regarding institutional procedures and inertness as 
well as man’s limited ability to think and act rationally. In the ‘brutal’ 
confrontations with both the third and with the economy, ethical 
dilemmas easily arise. In the field of professional ethics much attention 
is paid to training in how to cope with ethical dilemmas. Without such 
training one may easily, when facing an ethical dilemma, end up in 
despair, cynicism or moralism, neither of which can be regarded as 
ethical. 
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Going back to the example of the meeting between the nurse and 
the financial manager, everyone will, and so must also the two parts 
involved, admit – after some reflection on the matter – that they are 
both right, from each of their subjective perspectives. Both have 
legitimate arguments for their claims, each from their position. But how 
can they both be right, and where can the situation move from there? 
Let us discuss this further by using the two concepts mercy and justice. 
‘Mercy’ is a word we use as a substitute for a logical reason of a 
unilateral good act that does not expect any return. Care given by mercy 
needs no reason. When we show mercy to the other we do it as a 
singular case. The other is not in a position of deserving it, maybe rather 
the opposite: I may choose to show mercy instead of what from a 
justice point of view rather should require revenge or punishment. 
‘Justice’, on the other hand, is the art of treating people equally, also in 
distribution of care and goods, independent of the person, only 
dependent on the situation, in the way that any other person in the same 
situation would have received the same treatment. Care given out of 
consideration for justice needs a reason. In this discussion I may use 
terms I have used earlier. Explaining justice belongs to the ‘exercise’ 
consisting of making singular situations equal to each other; it is 
rendering the other into the same, to the general, preferably by referring to 
universal principles. This is the exercise of language, which we also use 
when we define something by putting it into categories. Acts of mercy, on 
the other hand, belong to singular cases, the particularities that are not 
captured by generalising language and its logic. (That may also be why 
principles of mercy so easily turn into hypocrisy).  In the meeting 
between the nurse and the financial manager the latter can explain and 
justify the expenditure cuts by claiming that he or she is responsible for 
justice in the allocation of resources available to the hospital. The nurse, 
on his or her side, will, from his or her encounter with the patient, and 
his or her own professional ethics, argue for mercy towards those who 
will suffer from the budget cuts. In that way mercy will come into 
conflict with justice, a conflict that will be thoroughly discussed in the 
next chapter. But, as I have already noted, justice has the power on its 
side, because it can be expressed in a general language, abstracted from 
the particular cases. The financial manager can easily refer to other 
particular cases, on other units of the hospital, where appeal is also 
made to mercy, but a mercy for others than those whom the nurse 
meets. 
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This conflict exemplifies what ethical dilemmas usually are about, in 
various versions of professional ethics. Going back to the ethics of care 
we will find no general solutions to these ethical dilemmas. The result is 
often a communication barrier between ethics of care on the one side 
and economic knowledge on the other. In the next chapter I will 
demonstrate how Levinas suggests a way to break through this barrier 
of communication. One of his points is to distinguish between the 
asymmetric encounter with the (different) other, on the one hand, and 
the symmetric meeting between several persons, out in society, in 
organizations and the economy, on the other. This makes Levinas 
especially suitable for understanding the relation between economy and 
ethics. More explicitly than other authors, Levinas insists that the 
transformation from relating to one other to that of relating to several 
others is not a continuous transition, but is instead a discontinuous 
jump. All ‘good’ experiences with another person, that is, all the ethical 
qualities such as trust, charity, love and respect, cannot immediately be 
transferred to relations to more than one other, that is, to the 
participation in economic and social reality. Instead they must be 
transformed through, for instance, the concept of justice. There is thus a 
crucial connection here: considering justice as something impersonal 
and exclusively rational is insufficient. However, if we want to apply 
ethics by finding just solutions to specific problems and dilemmas, 
Levinas’ main contribution – that is, his discussion of the encounter 
with the Other – is not a part of such an ‘applied ethics’. His concern 
was primarily to find the meaning of ethics. He asked, and tried to answer, 
the question ‘Why do we strive for justice?’ (when we do). But then it 
emerges, fortunately for us, that the answer he suggests to this question 
also helps us, both in finding a meaningful, general connection between 
mercy and justice, and in giving us an understanding of the economy 
and the monetary system as possible efficient means for justice – and 
also for injustice. This is the matter I shall now go into. 
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Ethics in the Economy 
Emmanuel Levinas: a brief biography 
In this chapter I will show how Levinas manages to connect ethics with 
economy. Before going into this, however, it may be useful to have a 
short review of his life and works. 
Emmanuel Levinas was born in 1906 in the town Kaunas in 
Lithuania, which was then a part of Russia, neighbouring the region 
Kaliningrad, where another Emmanuel, Immanuel Kant, was born 
almost 200 years earlier. Levinas followed Kant’s philosophy a long way, 
but his Jewish background and especially his experiences from the 
Second World War meant that Levinas did not follow Kant’s and his 
Age of Enlightenment’s optimism regarding the development of 
humanity. At the age of 17 Levinas went to Strasbourg in France to 
study philosophy. In 1931 he became a French citizen and he regarded 
himself as French, living in Paris for the rest of his life. During the 
holocaust his entire family in Lithuania was killed and he later said that 
his biography “is dominated by a presentiment of the Nazi terror and its 
memory thereafter” (Levinas, 1990: 291). Parallel to his philosophical 
production Levinas published a great number of interpretations of 
Jewish scriptures. Although he kept these two interests apart from each 
other, there is no doubt that his contribution to philosophy draws on 
the Jewish tradition. After the Holocaust Levinas lost any illusion he 
may have had that ethics develops from reason, as Kant suggested. 
Reason is based in the self while ethics comes to the self as a disturbing 
element in the encounter with the face of the Other. He agreed with 
Kant that the moral law comes before anything else, also before any 
attempts to put words to it, as something both universal and holy. As 
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opposed to Kant, however, Levinas meant that ethics cannot be 
captured by reason. He elaborates this idea in his first main work, 
Totality and Infinity (Levinas, 1991a), first published in 1961. Here he 
emphasises that what Kant called the moral law has its source outside 
the I, namely in the Other. In his second main work, first published in 
1974, with the English title Otherwise than Being, or, Beyond Essence 
(Levinas, 1991b), he adjusted some of his views on the source of moral 
law. Ethics is found within the self, but is still inaccessible to reason. It 
can only be awakened and manifested as a response to the call for 
responsibility from the Other. 
Levinas entered a dialogue with the French postmodern 
philosophers, especially with the most prominent of them, Jacques 
Derrida. This dialogue has given his philosophy resilience in 
confrontations with so-called ‘deconstruction’ in postmodern thinking. 
This is especially important to ethics: all Western philosophy from 
Aristotle to Kant (and, if one wishes, even further) appears to many as 
just empty words faced with all the cruelty and inhumanity we see in the 
world today. Levinas ‘saves’ the source of ethics exactly by lifting it out 
of a cruel reality, but without at the same time lifting it into any religious 
or ethical domain. This will be further explained in the following. 
The conatus 
“Each thing in so far as it is in itself endeavours to persist in its own 
being”. This is one of the basic propositions of Spinoza’s Ethics (1997: 
98). It applies to all unliving, such as a stone, and it applies to all living, 
such as a human. It can be applied also to physical and biological 
systems. The human body is composed of cells possessing as their most 
important aspect a ‘drive’ to continue to exist; they have through 
evolution developed the ability to maintain both themselves and the 
part of their environment on which they depend to keep living, that is, 
other cells, and their ‘host’, the body. Thus, the body does what ‘it’ can 
to continue to be. Spinoza’s proposition may also be applied to the 
human as a mental being (neurophysiologists will certainly see a 
connection here): I will continue to be me. This will to preserve oneself 
Spinoza called (in Latin) conatus essendi. 
Violence and murder are to Levinas (1985: 86) extreme cases of the 
conatus. The need for economic freedom and the economic knowledge 
supporting this need is also an implication of the conatus. But Spinoza’s 
idea of a large ‘we’ as an all-encompassing, harmonious deity is not 
Ethics in Economy 
65 
found in the works of Levinas, and this became even clearer to Levinas 
after the Holocaust. According to Zygmunt Bauman (1989) the 
Holocaust was a natural consequence of modernity. The time was 
mature when it became technologically and organizationally possible. 
Levinas went deeper: the Holocaust was an expression of the human 
conatus. 
In his struggle for freedom, autonomy and happiness, man has to – 
as I have described earlier in this book – conceive his surroundings, 
including his fellow men. In my own ‘project of being’, consisting 
primarily in obtaining and exercising individual freedom and achieving a 
good life, I also involve others. This project is driven by a will to 
‘totalise’ the world, within a conceivable knowledge. Economic freedom 
presumes a self-centred understanding of reality (Burggraeve, 2003: 57). 
Business ethics, in the sense of ethics for business, illustrates this: its 
perspective is that of an ‘enlightened self-interest’ where the constraints 
that are put on the individual, thanks to the ability to see the 
unfortunate consequences for oneself, postpone the ‘war’, in a direct or 
metaphoric sense of the word (ibid.: 70-71). This enlightened self-
interest forms the base not only of the market economy, but also of a 
social organization and manifestation of human rights, and even of 
some ethical theories. It is a calculated and voluntary renunciation of 
one’s own freedom in order to obtain in return security and other 
common goals (ibid.: 72).  
The fact that economic, political and legal theories appeal to 
enlightened self-interest does not imply, however, that we should 
discard them. Nor should we reject proclamations of human rights, legal 
constraints of individual freedom and, for that matter, business ethics, 
even if they are based on an enlightened self-interest. It is rather the 
opposite: such institutions and knowledge are indispensable because the 
primary quality of the enlightened self-interest is that it restricts 
egocentricity. Our practical reason (which was Kant’s words for the reason 
that governs our acts, where the moral law is embedded as a principle) 
includes the knowledge that it can be rational to lay certain restrictions 
on individual freedom. In this way practical reason may postpone (for 
an indefinite time) violence and murder among people. This has 
primarily been the raison-d’être of politics and the state, but it is today 
taken over more and more by corporate organizations, as expressed in 
the new term for business ethics, as corporate social responsibility and 
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corporate citizenship (see chapter 2). Thanks to this ‘postponement of 
violence’ provided by politics and economic rationality, people may 
unfold their freedom within the laws and regulations set up by society 
(Burggraeve, 2003: 77). 
Beyond this observation, however, and more interestingly to Levinas 
– and to us – is the question from where the idea derives that there is a 
possible alternative to pursuing one’s self-interest, enlightened or not. 
Levinas’ answer to this question is that this idea is called forth in me in 
the encounter with the different other, who denies to be captured by me 
and my understanding. 
The call of the Other 
All instrumental knowledge, such as business management, is, and has 
to be, as already noted, normative, conventional and logically 
explainable. But there are also other motives for our actions, which are 
neither normative, conventional nor explainable (as these properties are 
explained in the previous chapter), as we discover when the subject sets 
itself aside to the advantage of the other (and when this is not 
calculated, as in an ‘enlightened self-interest’), for instance in a mother’s 
care for her child or a nurse’s care for his or her patient. Within a 
rational frame of understanding this kind of inexplicable behaviour is 
often made invisible, as it lacks linguistic and understandable categories. 
The motive for these actions of setting the other before oneself is 
what I here call ethics. A possible explanation of why ethics, as an idea of 
the good, may emerge is the following: a human has the faculty to be 
conscious and to reflect about himself or herself. Thus he or she can 
also observe his or her own conatus, and he or she has the possibility to 
question this conatus. By the same faculty the I can also question itself as 
a subject, driven by its conatus. The ability of questioning oneself and 
one’s conatus is called forth in the presence of the Other, as a response 
to the call of the Other. But Levinas goes even further than this: neither 
the I nor its conatus exists by itself before the Other enters the scene. 
The manifestation of the I and the manifestation of the conatus is a 
response to the call of the Other. The Other is ‘there’ before the I; in 
fact, the I is formed as a result of responses and interaction, starting 
with the Other addressing the becoming I. Further, the call of the Other 
can only be responded to by the I by standing up and saying (explicitly 
or implicitly) ‘here I am’, that is, by taking responsibility as a responsible 
I. Only when the I has announced itself as a responsible I, can the 
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development of the self and the development of its knowledge, and 
with this a common understanding of the world, proceed. 
As a consequence of the assumption that the call for responsibility 
from the Other is prior to my understanding of the world, the Other 
cannot be included in this understanding. The Other remains 
unintelligible to me, in the sense that it is impossible for me to put him 
or her in a category without reducing him or her into the same as 
something else, and thus reducing him or her into an object, within my 
concept and my language, and thereby causing a violation of him or her 
as a unique person. To be confronted with the non-understandable is an 
experience that invites me to think, at the same time as it escapes 
thought. The impossibility of understanding the Other is exactly what 
makes me realise that not everything can be captured by my concepts 
and understanding (Burggraeve, 2003: 91). This experience invites me to 
humility in my approach to others. 
As the reader will have noticed already, it has been common in 
English translations of the works of Levinas to write ‘the Other’ with a 
capital ‘O’. This notation underlines the point that the other person 
cannot be controlled by denoting it in a category through a word; he or 
she remains a unique person, a respect we also show when writing 
names with capital initials. 
Ethics, defined as the idea that it is possible to do otherwise than 
setting oneself before others, presumes an ability to be open towards 
the Other without the intention to fully understand. To the subject the 
Other is objectively given because he or she is there regardless of 
whether or not the subject is there. The Other meets me with his or her 
face. The face is that which addresses me and calls for a response. It 
questions me, the fact that I am, and the fact that in my own self-
centredness I make efforts to preserve my own being. The face of the 
Other questions me, without any language, what right I have to be and 
whether I, simply by being, take the place of someone else (Levinas, 
1985: 121). 
The face of the Other is unthematisable, but still Levinas again and 
again tries to approach it verbally. This may seem to be a paradox, 
which Levinas admits. One way of describing this paradox is to say that 
from my encounter with the (unthematisable) face of the Other I am 
brought into social reality with other people (the third, the fourth, etc., 
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including the reader) and in this world I can use language to describe the 
encounter with the Other from an immemorable past. 
One of several of Levinas’ descriptions of the face of the Other is to 
call it vulnerable and naked, as it cannot hide itself behind something 
that represents it. At the same time it offers itself to me, because it has 
no other way to communicate than by its appearance. To me the 
encounter with the Other comes in conflict with my need to understand 
and explain, a need that is at the base of my efforts to exist as an I, a 
need that is also the root of violence against others. To me, with my 
conatus, the face of the Other, through its weakness and vulnerability, 
creates a temptation and a challenge to exert violence (Levinas, 1985: 
86). The naked and mortal face invites me and my conatus to reduce it to 
something I can control, so that I can eliminate the non-understandable. 
This is why Levinas can say that the conatus is a response to the call of 
the Other. But at the same time, by its mere appearance, the face also 
resists being controlled by me (Burggraeve, 2003: 96-97). The face of 
the Other appears to me as a disarming authority. 
My conatus and my efforts to understand the world develop from a 
response to the call from the Other, while the Other remains 
inaccessible to these efforts. The Other’s call for responsibility comes to 
me in spite of my self, my conatus and my knowledge. This experience 
contradicts how I understand my own place in my own understanding 
of the world. As the Copernican revolution followed from the discovery 
that the earth was not the centre of the Universe, Levinas insists that the 
thinking subject is not at the centre of its own universe. It is no longer I 
who acknowledges and estimates the other; prior to that it is I who am 
evaluated, acknowledged, estimated, and questioned (Levinas, 1991b: 
109). This substitution with regards to who is in the centre of my 
universe is not something I can decide. It is not the free subject who 
actively gives place to the Other (or chooses not to do so). The centre 
of my universe is already, before I can do anything as a subject, 
occupied by the Other, as the one who addresses me and by that 
‘awakens’ my self (ibid.: 99-102). 
The Copernican revolution did not only explain why the earth is not 
the centre of the universe; it also explained why and how, seen from the 
earth, it looks like the earth still is at the centre. (The new knowledge 
emerged exactly because there was something wrong with this 
presupposition). Similarly, we can say that Levinas describes the self-
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centredness and its important and indispensable role in all instrumental 
knowledge, but at the same time also the ‘discovery’ that there is 
something that cannot be right in this conventional, self-centred 
knowledge: if the self-centredness had not been continuously 
questioned by the Other we would have had an ever escalating process 
of conflicts ending in violence and murder. 
I cannot choose not to respond to the call of the Other. I cannot 
escape the appeal in the face of the Other. I have to respond. How I 
respond will depend on how I use my freedom, but all that I choose to 
say and to do is a response to the Other addressing me. An attempt to 
ignore the Other is, morally, a strongly negative response; it is an 
attempt to reduce the Other to an object. The face of the Other calls me 
to respond ‘yes’, that is, ‘here I am’, but I can say ‘no’ by pretending I 
am invisible. But what I then actually do is to pretend that the Other is 
invisible, which is a violation of him or her. (The context may of course 
be such that there is a common acceptance that one cannot greet 
everyone, as for instance in a big city. Such conventions are parts of the 
social constructions that necessarily have to follow from the meeting 
with the third, which will be discussed soon). The face confronts me 
with the choice of either turning the Other into an object and a means 
in my conatus, or committing myself to the (unconditioned) call for 
responsibility.  
The striving for justice 
What is original in Levinas compared to other authors who also have 
defined being a human as being related to another human, such as, for 
instance, Buber and Løgstrup (mentioned in the previous chapter), and 
those representing the ethics of care (also presented in the previous 
chapter), is that Levinas acknowledges that I not only meet the Other, 
but also the third, as the Other. By meeting the third I am again 
confronted with an appeal for mercy. From this – as a result of an 
intention of being responsible – I am forced to evaluate, compare, 
reason and to seek what is just. Justice exerts violence but is still better 
than injustice. In my efforts towards more justice I must compare, and 
in this comparing I may have to count, also money; it may even be 
necessary to set a price for a human life, something that, from the point 
of view of mercy, is a scandal, but still necessary, because the third is 
also there. It is necessary to count; the question is why I count. Is it out 
of my conatus, which, if it is allowed to unfold freely without being 
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questioned (or, alternatively, if I ignore the questioning), will lead to 
violence? Or is it out of mercy, which comes to me as an imperative in 
the encounter with the Other, and which, in the encounter with the 
third – as the Other – drives me to seek always more justice? This is not 
only about counting, it is about being in general – why and how I am. 
Levinas will insist that “To be or not to be, that is not the question” 
(Cohen in Levinas, 1985: 10). Instead, it is a question of how I am a 
being together with others in the world. Ethics comes before ontology. 
An objection to Noddings’ ethics of care is that the mother-infant-
situation is not a common one. It is instead a special situation where 
special qualities are called forth, that are not found elsewhere in society. 
To believe that the good is natural can be naïve; it can even be 
dangerous. Looking around in the world today the opposite would be 
more natural to claim: we have a natural inclination towards controlling 
and reducing the Other, with violence, physical or psychological. But 
through the encounter with the Other we are told that this is wrong. It 
is this small ‘source of the good’ which dominates a mother when she is 
alone with her infant. 
At the moment we have to relate to more than one other we 
understand that we need to make some efforts to understand the 
situation of the other individuals, their special situations and needs, so 
that we can know what is just in our dealing with others. It is his 
discussion of the meeting with the third that makes Levinas’ philosophy 
so relevant to economy, although most presentations of his philosophy 
concentrate on the encounter with the Other, and may thus cause the 
misunderstanding that this is his ethics, and consequently a quite 
impossible one. However, as mentioned earlier, Levinas’ description of 
the encounter with the Other is his answer to the question of what is 
the meaning of ethics, or, why we at all (at least sometimes) want justice. 
In short, to Levinas, the task of the economy is to contribute to justice. 
The cause of the striving for justice is the imperative of mercy in the 
encounter with the Other. And as there is always more than one other 
my experience of the encounter with the Other cannot be directly 
transferred to social reality. I must perform a brutal transformation 
from mercy to justice (but which nevertheless is less brutal than me not 
caring about justice), and in doing so I need as much as I can possibly 
acquire of what is available of detailed knowledge of each particular 
situation, as well as my ability to reason logically. 
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It is not only a fact that ethics is necessary for the economy. 
Economy is also necessary for ethics. Just as a house may be a concrete 
security for a loan, the economy is a concrete security for ethics. 
Without economic goods and needs and the accompanying knowledge 
for myself, there would have been no need for ethics. An ethics for the other 
can only be expressed as long as the other has specific needs competing 
with mine. Only then can I act for the other instead of acting for myself, 
and thus set the needs of the other before those of me. Or, put in 
another way: angels do not need ethics, because they have no needs and 
thus no need to help each other. 
Levinas on the role of money 
In his article ‘Sociality and money’, based on a speech given in 1986 to 
the Belgian Association of Saving Banks, Levinas suggests that the call 
for mercy is transformed into a striving for justice in a monetary society. 
Below is the last and summing up paragraph of this article, interrupted 
with my comments: 
The third, other than the neighbour, is also my neighbour and my 
neighbour’s neighbour. (Levinas, 2007: 206) 
Levinas addresses here an issue that is often neglected in ethical 
literature: I face not only one other person, but other others as well. 
This question is crucial with respect to economic life. Levinas has been 
criticised for not having dealt properly with more than one other. I do 
not agree with this criticism. On the contrary, Levinas emphasises the 
necessity of going from the Other to the third, as will be clearly shown 
in the following. 
Are the elevation and sanctity of love for the neighbour not comprised 
in this lack of concern for the third which, in an anonymous totality, 
can have been the victim of that very one I answer for and that I 
approach in the mercy and charity of dis-inter-estedness? (ibid.) 
Here Levinas indicates how the ethical dilemma generated by my 
encounter with both the Other and the third is approached: the 
encounter with the Other in which I am called to show mercy does not 
belong to the social inter-being (inter-est) of men and women, that is, 
where I also encounter the third (and the fourth etc). Instead, the 
encounter with the Other is detached from this inter-being (dis-inter-ested). In 
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this encounter with the Other, detached from social inter-being, I may 
also meet the third, but then as the Other. Actually, it may very well be 
that it is the third whom I encounter in this way, as it is the third who 
easily becomes the victim of my mercy and charity towards the Other. 
Between the unique ones, a comparison, a judgement is needed. Justice 
is needed in the very name of their dignity as unique and incomparable. 
(ibid.) 
Here Levinas introduces the problem of comparison and justice. Each 
person I meet is unique, but as I am confronted with more than one 
other, I am forced to compare and to judge between them. This is a 
violation in itself. On the other hand, however, the very idea of justice 
in such comparisons and judgements has its source in my encounter 
with the one, unique Other, in the dignity and incomparability which 
follows from the uniqueness of this Other. The idea of justice is thus an 
idea of minimising the necessary violation caused by my placing the 
third second when I place the Other first. Consequently, no solution 
can ever be just enough. 
But how then can I obtain the most just solution possible between 
more than one other? To this question Levinas now turns: 
But to compare the incomparable is, undoubtedly, to approach people 
by returning to the totality of men in the economic order, in which their 
acts are measured in the homogeneity immanent to money, without 
being absorbed or simply added up in this totality. (ibid.) 
My encounter with the Other is, as already mentioned, detached from 
the social inter-being of men and women. This does not mean that my 
encounter with the Other takes place in a separate, exclusive space 
where I am alone with the Other, sheltered from the rest of the world. 
When I encounter the face of the Other I am at the same time placed in 
social and economic reality with the third. And it is exactly the 
economic order, with money as a homogenous measure of value, that 
provides me with what I need in order to be able to compare and to 
seek justice in my comparing, in my judging and my use of rational tools 
such as budgets, so that my violation of the third can become as small 
as possible. It is because my encounter with the Other takes place in the 
midst of social and economic reality, and not in some separated, other 
place, that I am continuously reminded that the third is also the Other, a 
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reminder that helps me to avoid the third disappearing as a number in a 
row within the social and economic system. 
The saintliness of the human rising above being persevering in its being, 
and above the violences this perseverance perpetuates, heralds response, 
in mercy and charity, to the face of the Other; but it also appeals to 
Reason and law. (ibid.) 
The being and the inter-being of men and women is dominated by 
‘persevering in being’ and by the violation of others caused by this 
perseverance. However, elevated above this inter-being I am confronted 
with, in the face of the Other, the saintliness of the human. The face of 
the Other appeals to my mercy. But as the third is also the Other, the 
face of the Other also calls me to seek, through reason and through law, 
always more justice. 
However, justice already requires a State, institutions, rigour and an 
informed and impartial authority. But an already liberal State capable of 
better legislation. (ibid.) 
Striving for justice requires states and organizations with all that follows 
from these forms of consistency and authority. But because no social 
and economic system can ever be just enough, organizations must be 
liberal, in the sense that they are prepared to review their own rules, and 
to reopen previous cases, towards always more justice. 
And consciences awoken in their uniqueness to unpredictable resources 
to which an ever harsh universality can bring non-deducible grace. (ibid.) 
Levinas closes the text by reminding us that the unforeseeable and the 
undeserved of mercy towards my neighbour should not be kept out of 
social and economic reality. Humanity and charity come into the world 
as ‘non-deducible grace’, as for instance when I as a leader am forced to 
compare the incomparable of each of my employees, in distributing a 
limited budget among them. Then I must at the same time see each of 
them as unique individuals, not only in order to be reminded to seek as 
much justice as possible (by means of reason and correct calculations), 
but also so that I can show mercy to any one of them, when an 
unforeseen opportunity for this suddenly emerges. 
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Summing up Levinas 
When I as a being do what I can to persist in being, I follow what 
Spinoza calls the conatus of all beings, dead or alive. In this conatus I am 
basically self-centred (with the reservations I will soon make); all I think 
and do, including my ability and my efforts to understand, or conceive, 
the world around me, has a self-centred perspective – it is I who 
conceives my surroundings – as well as a self-centred goal – it is I who is 
to persist. In this way Levinas explains our behaviour in the market, 
which is to seek welfare and happiness for ourselves. (But we also seek 
welfare and happiness for others; see below.) In this way he also 
explains Nazism, as well as the inclination to violence and murder 
throughout the history of man. (But not even Nazis were without ethics 
– again: stay with me to the next link in my line of arguments). 
But – and this is what I have denoted ‘the call of the Other’ – 
humans have as the only beings (as far as we know) the faculty to be 
conscious about themselves. This means that I can reflect upon my own 
conatus, and thus question it. I am able to acknowledge that the conatus is 
not a natural law, but that it is also possible for me not to follow it. But 
why should I want to do otherwise than pursue my self-interest? And 
what should that be? By help of my own self-consciousness I can only 
grasp the idea that it is possible to do otherwise than to follow my 
conatus. Which other, meaningful possibilities there could be will not 
become clear to me until I meet the Other, that is, another human 
being. Meeting the Other, with his or her needs, I realise that it is 
possible for me to be for the Other. But I can, of course, choose whether 
I at all want to do anything for the Other, or if I will still prioritise 
myself, that is, follow my conatus. In other words, the conatus is no longer 
a given instinct, it is a response to the call for responsibility from the 
Other. With acknowledging the possibility of prioritising the Other 
before myself, which it is up to me to choose or not, I ‘discover’ ethics 
as something that comes to me before any understanding, conception 
and concepts, and which exists independently of me and my conceived 
world. 
But – and here is the background to what I have denoted ‘the 
striving for justice’ – life is not as simple as having a choice between 
only two alternatives: either to pursue my self-interest, that is, to 
prioritise myself before the Other, or to follow the ethical appeal to 
prioritise the Other before myself. I cannot only relate to only one 
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other; I will continuously meet more than one other. Thus I must also 
decide how to prioritise between them. Levinas suggests a way of how 
this is actually done in society. As already mentioned, his point was to 
view ethics as a possibility, namely the possibility to break with the self-
centred conatus, that is, the possibility to set the Other before oneself. 
He certainly speaks about an ethical demand in the encounter with the 
Other as an imperative to be unconditionally for the Other, and not as 
some type of half-hearted request to also think of the Other. But it is 
nevertheless still up to me to decide whether I will meet this demand. 
The only thing I know for certain is that I am also responsible for 
whatever I choose to do. Thus, even if I can choose my own actions I 
cannot choose away the responsibility, neither for my actions nor for 
not acting. It is this possibility to choose that makes it possible to 
discuss ethics at all; if we had acted out of necessity there would have 
been no ethics. Out in society, among other people, ethically, it is the 
possibilities that are of importance, more than what becomes the outcome 
in each singular case. I may prioritise myself before all others, as, for 
instance, in my market behaviour, or in an exertion of violence. But 
there is also another possibility and that is, as I have already pointed out, 
something I realise when confronted with the Other, who questions me 
and thus makes me able to set the Other before myself. Among more 
than one other, however, I can no longer set the Other first without at 
the same time de-prioritising all the other others. In an ethical 
perspective the meeting with several others thus becomes the meeting 
with a brutal reality: to put one other first is to put all others behind. 
Meeting the other others implies an unavoidable violence, Levinas says, 
because by prioritising the Other I de-prioritise the third. Therefore, 
putting the Other first can be an ethical act only in the encounter with 
one other. Thus, the encounter with the Other, in the way Levinas 
describes it, does not belong to ‘this world’, as there is also the third. 
Nevertheless, Levinas describes the encounter with the Other as a 
human experience, as a phenomenon, described in the 
phenomenological tradition, as it appears to the subject. 
In society, in the economy, in an organization, in short, in any social 
reality, to put one other first would not be a good moral act, as it 
implies ignoring the third. Ethics, in the special sense that I am first 
called to responsibility by the Other, has thus, to me, as a subject, 
meaning only in a particular event of encountering only one other. The 
meeting with the third and thereby with society in general, may thus 
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easily lead me back to the self-centred conatus (interrupted only by 
sporadic encounters with the Other, maybe expressed as strong bonds 
of loyalty to one or a few like-minded others), because ethics in its 
original sense becomes impossible. 
The idea behind this application of ethics is crucial to Levinas: the 
ethical appeal in the encounter with first the Other and then the third – 
also as the Other – makes me try to make my response to the third as 
little brutal as possible. This I can achieve by always striving for more 
justice – not for the sake of the Other, but for that of the others. To strive 
for always more justice does not mean to fight for one’s own rights. 
Instead it means to make the transition from the experience of what it 
means to place the Other first, to the meeting with the third and the 
impossibility of placing the Other and the third first, with the least 
possible violence to all. The acknowledgement of the possibility of 
breaking with my conatus and of instead setting the Other first is thus 
the source of the wish for more justice; it is from the acknowledgement 
of the ethical possibility in the encounter with the Other that I find 
meaning in the desire for more justice in my responses to the others. 
By acknowledging the necessity of the brutal transition from putting 
the Other first to justice, from the Other to all the other others, 
Levinas’ philosophy becomes more realistic than many of those ethical 
theories that concentrate on my relation to the other without regard for 
the third, which is the problem with the ethics of care I discussed in the 
previous chapter. Levinas’ philosophy has also become an important 
reference in so-called ‘post-Holocaustian ethics’, pursuing the discussion 
of what kind of ethics can be credible at all after the Holocaust, when all 
well-known ethical theories and ideals developed by and within Western 
‘civilisation’ to still more people appear as nothing but ‘empty words’, 
without any consequences for people’s lives. His philosophy does not 
end up with a certain ethical theory, presented as an addition to 
knowledge and its understanding of empirical reality. Instead, his 
conclusion is that we must recur to the practical, social and economic life 
and the existing empirical knowledge about it, or, as Husserl taught him 
– and us: we must go to ‘the thing itself’. Only then will we realise that 
all people in their lives are driven by their conatus and a self-centred need 
to understand the world around them, but also by something more than 
that, or else we would have had no concepts of ethics. What we have 
learned from our short ‘travel’ out to this world and back again is that 
people have a desire for more justice and that we now know where this 
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desire comes from: there is within us a desire for justice which does not 
come from any logical lines of reasoning saying that some justice may 
be ‘smart’ in the view of an enlightened self-interest, but which instead 
comes from: 
1. My experiences of the encounter with the Other, making me 
realise that my conatus is one but not the only possible response to 
this encounter, another being to prioritise the Other before myself; 
and 
2. Acknowledging that together with the others I have a possibility 
to make the necessary brutality against the third, who is also the 
Other, less brutal, by always striving for more justice, in the market, 
in society and within any kind of organization. 
What is needed in order to find new and more just solutions and 
systems is first and foremost knowledge about these systems, that is, 
about markets and about production, performance and distribution of 
goods and services; it is this knowledge to which we will have to recur, 
instead of first rejecting it by declaring it exclusively immoral and then 
seeking some or other general, ethical theory. 
It is a point of importance to describe the striving for more justice 
as an effort towards ‘always more justice’ and not ‘continuously more 
justice’. This is because it cannot be taken for granted that even the very 
strongest efforts for achieving more justice will make society 
continuously more just. The conatus, when it unfolds in the market and 
in society at large, often works in the opposite direction, causing 
frequent setbacks with respect to justice, both locally, nationally and 
globally, as we may observe in political regimes where political support 
for free market forces replaces the substantial and useful knowledge 
(that may well be instrumental) about the industries, goods and services 
which it is all about. Thus, we have no guarantee that it will all ‘end 
well’. In fact, we will never reach a society that is ‘just enough’. 
But if our efforts are sound in our recurrence to knowledge, in 
economics, political science, law, education, social work, medicine, 
nursing etc., together with our newly acquired insight in the 
aforementioned reason and desire for always more justice, and with 
certain possibilities to set this knowledge out in practice, it is still 
possible to hope. 
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Summary, Conclusion and Consequences 
Summary 
News media from time to time present stories of events where business 
leaders have ‘passed the line’ of what is considered to be decent. As 
discussed in the introduction of this book, it is not easy to know how 
common such cases are. It may also be that the appointment of a 
scapegoat belongs to a social-psychological mechanism, so that we all 
can preserve the belief that these events are exceptions from a general 
rule, suggesting that business leaders most of the time behave within 
both moral and legal boundaries. As soon as the scapegoat is removed, 
order and system are re-established, until the next event occurs. As one 
cannot exclude the possibility that such events may occur more 
frequently than we want to believe, I have in this book chosen a 
perspective on the relation between ethics and economy that may make 
it easier to approach such events: cases of ‘misconduct’ are actually easy 
to understand. Business leaders are under constant pressure to stretch 
limits in order to obtain always better results. It is the cases (how rare or 
frequent they may be) where they resist the temptation to make such 
decisions that need to be explained. From this perspective the following 
question would be the most natural to ask: from where comes the idea 
that it is possible to do otherwise than to place oneself before others? 
This idea, which I have called ‘the idea of the good’, is in this book what 
I have called ethics. The next question is then: how is this idea of the 
good put into practice? These two questions I have tried to answer in 
this book. Let me give a short summary of the discussion before I 
suggest my answers to them. 
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I started by describing economic thought and how it emerged in the 
Age of Enlightenment from the individual’s desire for freedom. I then 
showed how economic knowledge in recent years has primarily changed 
from being knowledge for society and government authorities to 
becoming knowledge for the management of companies. As a natural 
extension of this ‘new economic knowledge’ the knowledge called 
‘business ethics’ has developed to meet the demand of business leaders 
to know how to cope with ethical challenges made by society. 
Then I discussed the phenomenon of subjectivity, especially related 
to the efforts of understanding. I showed how all understanding has a 
self-centred perspective, a property that does not call for moral 
criticism, but instead tells us that reason and understanding have their 
limits, particularly when it comes to approaches that we usually consider 
ethical. 
From this preliminary conclusion I then moved to the part of reality 
where ethics actually is practiced, more specifically in the professions of 
care, and how an ethics of care is described within these professions. I 
showed how this ethics of care runs into a problem in its confrontation 
with ‘economic reality’, because it does not sufficiently treat the 
qualitative jump from relating to one other to that of relating to more 
than one other. From there I introduced the philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas, ending with his reflections on monetary society. In short, 
Levinas teaches us that through the encounter with the Other my self-
centred conatus is questioned and thereby awakens the idea in me that it 
is possible to do otherwise than setting myself before others, not only as 
an idea, but as an ethical call. Such an appeal of putting the Other first 
in all situations, however, is impossible to live up to, as there is always 
more than one other who appeals to my mercy. The best I can do is to 
make the violations of the others less than they are, resulting in 
knowledge-based reflections on the concept of justice. 
Instead of finishing with an ethical theory, or with a general theory 
of justice, Levinas concludes that we must recur to reality and the 
knowledge we have already acquired about this reality. Only knowledge 
about the real world can help us find the best options for making 
arrangements, routines or rules more just. There is already a lot of 
knowledge on justice; think only of all knowledge within the legal 
system and the field of law. One question, however, that is seldom 
asked within this knowledge is why we seek justice. Certainly, there have 
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been attempts to explain this question logically and scientifically (and by 
that also self-centredly), by presenting justice as some sort of 
enlightened self-interest. But this still does not provide any sufficient 
explanation as to why we seek justice. The answer to this question, 
according to Levinas, cannot fully be explained in words, because the I 
as a thinking subject is ‘set out of function’ in the moment this insight 
reaches me, in the way that I and my being is questioned in the 
encounter with the Other. Ethics and thus also the proper meaning of 
justice is something I can only find in the face of the Other; it cannot be 
thematised further by my own concepts and my own understanding, as 
these tools can only be applied in a self-centred perspective. 
Conclusion 
In my introduction I posed the following two questions, to which this 
book has tried to develop answers: 
1. From where does the idea that it is possible to do otherwise than 
privileging oneself over others come?  
2. This idea, which we may call ‘the idea of the good’, or, as we will 
call it here, ethics – how is it transformed into practical conduct? 
Based on the discussion in this book I will suggest the following 
answers to these questions: 
1. The idea that there are other ways of acting than to choose those 
acts which set myself before others, in other words, the idea I have 
here called ethics, is not developed from reason. Instead, it strikes me 
as a disturbing idea in the direct encounter with another human 
being. But as I will always have to relate to more than this one 
Other, this idea of the good, of being an I-for-the-Other, is something 
that does not belong to the social world of inter-being among 
people. If it did, I would have favoured the one other before all other 
others. Ethics, as the idea of the good, will thus have to be 
transformed into something else before it can be applied in practice. 
This makes question 2 no less important than question 1. 
2. The idea of the good, striking me in the encounter with the one 
Other, becomes a reason for me to endeavour to act justly and to 
always be more just, so that any violation of others can become less 
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than it is, through the necessary comparison, counting, evaluation 
and prioritising that I am always forced to make. At the same time it 
is important that the systems, rules and routines in which I take part 
in order to form and sustain them, as they can never become just 
enough, are given space also to show mercy towards each one, acts 
that may cause a change towards more justice from the existing 
routines, rules and systems. 
Let us look a little closer at the implications of these answers. In the 
introduction to this book I chose the following perspective: the actions 
for which business leaders are criticised for showing bad social 
responsibility are actually easy to understand; it is their job to 
concentrate on the interests of their company and not on those of 
society. It is rather the cases where business leaders actually show 
responsibility beyond themselves and their own company that need to 
be explained. If the actions they are criticised for are the type of actions 
that prioritise their own individual interests, these may easily be 
understood as following on from the conatus. It is natural, not only for 
humans, but for all that exists, to do what is possible in order to 
continue to exist. In extreme cases this conatus may lead to violence and 
murder; in less extreme cases individuals try to control others through 
their use of language and through their understanding of reality, an 
understanding that will always have a self-centred perspective. What is 
often denoted as greed is an expression of the same conatus and should 
thus be easy to understand; expressions of the opposite may easily seem 
hypocritical. On the other hand, when business managers and other 
decision makers from time to time resist the temptation to follow this 
conatus, it is, according to Levinas, because, in the confrontation with 
another human being, they know that they have to answer for and 
explain their actions. When such a confrontation, or even only the 
thought of it, makes them choose otherwise than what simple business 
logic tells them, it is because the face of the Other has called forth the 
idea that such an alternative is possible, the idea we have here called 
ethics. However, as we have also seen, this idea cannot be put into 
practice as it is, because it does not belong to the social reality where I 
always have to relate to several others. The encounter with the Other 
takes place detached from this world, but it still works as a constant 
reason to act justly, in ways that attempt to make the violations of each 
of the others less than they are. 
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It is an important observation that this idea of the good does not 
always occur to the subject, nor that it always arouses attempts to find 
more just solutions. This is something we all know. What we can say to 
this is that in those cases where people actually choose differently to 
what is best for themselves, it may be because of ethics as an idea, as it 
is accounted for in this book, and what this idea leads to with regards to 
efforts toward justice, including our legal system as well as social 
institutions established to reduce injustice. 
Let me also say something about this difficult point about the 
encounter with the Other as something that takes place ‘not in the real 
world’ of inter-being among people. There exists a considerable 
literature about leadership and co-operation emphasising the 
importance of care, relations and closeness in society and working life. 
Such approaches to organization and working life communicate an 
important and valuable insight about the ethical relations between 
employer and employee. But they have all the same limitation and thus 
the same problem, earlier described in chapter 5 about the ethics of 
care: the relation to the third is hardly or not at all discussed, other than 
in treating the third as the other as an ethical ideal. This is of little help 
in the encounter with ‘economic reality’. To put the Other first will 
always be to the cost of the third. Such an ethics of care, closeness or 
relations treated by this literature will thus have the weakness that it may 
become a tool for the opposite purpose of what it recommends, that is, 
exclusion and violation of the third party standing outside the close 
relation. In this way ‘regimes of goodness’, trying to ‘practice ethics’, 
may become even worse than regimes based on the self-centred conatus, 
because the first have already ‘taken care of’ ethics, that is, in relation to 
each other, but excluding those who are outside the relationships. What 
is neglected in such ‘regimes of goodness’ is that the transformation 
from the Other to the third, that is, the transition from the one-to-one 
relation of a particular event to a social system with more than two 
participants and the general rules of this system, is not a continuous 
transition. It is rather the opposite: the transition from relating to only 
one to dealing with several others is discontinuous; it is a transition 
from mercy to justice, a transition that is brutal but necessary, when the 
ethical ideal meets economic reality. 
It is said about good leaders that they are ‘strict but just’. It should 
not be necessary to put in the ‘but’ in this expression: to be just is to be 
strict. But not only that: justice may sometimes be quite brutal from an 
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ethical perspective, that is, against such ethical values as charity and 
mercy. If I should try to characterise a good leader, it should rather be 
to say that he or she is ‘charitable but just’, as it is the claim for justice 
that sets the limits to how much charity and care one can bring from the 
meeting with the one Other to the meeting with the third (and the 
fourth, etc.). 
The slow, bureaucratic and centralistic economic systems were 
discarded by the people (both in West and East) mainly because they 
were regarded as unjust: first, they sustained unjust privileges for the top 
leaders and their relatives and, secondly, they caused a waste of 
resources. The discontent arose not because waste is wrong in itself 
(consumption is an example of economic waste that is not considered 
wrong), but because the waste was experienced as wrong because 
people did not receive goods that they could have received. In the same 
way the newer systems, following from an increased market orientation, 
such as introducing competition, privatisation and increased global 
trade, should be evaluated by how just they are. Are more resources 
spent on administration and high wages and privileges to leaders than 
what is considered just? Are those who receive welfare services that are 
now produced in competition better off than before? Is the gap 
between rich and poor becoming smaller? In other words, we should, as 
we have learned from Levinas, not remain in the ideal world of theories, 
but instead recur to reality. 
Consequences 
Having arrived at these conclusions the book would be incomplete if it 
stops here. Concluding that we should not remain in the spheres of 
theories but from there recur to reality, I am obliged to answer how that 
can be done. If the practical consequence of ethics, according to 
Levinas, are efforts towards always more justice, what does that mean? 
What consequences will this have for business and for politics? And 
what consequences will ethics in the sense of Levinas have on how we 
behave, or, rather, how we should behave, towards others and in 
society? And how and where do we search for new knowledge? We are 
left with a lot of questions and in this final section I will try to develop 
some answers to them, to the extent that such answers can be deduced 
from the above discussion. 
There is in society an increasing concern about the consequences of 
a globalised market economy, such as an increasing gap between rich 
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and poor, irreversible environmental devastations and an increasing 
pressure towards always more efficiency and cuts in budgets in private 
as well as public affairs. The critique that is expressed follows a long 
tradition of critical thought and actions against established power 
structures and authorities. This critical tradition rests on the works of 
prominent thinkers, among them Kant, Hegel and Marx: Kant (who, of 
course, stood on the shoulders of earlier great minds) systematised what 
we call critical philosophy, consisting of continuously applying empirical 
observations along with logical reasoning to question and restate 
common ideas of truth. Hegel formulated (also in line with a long 
philosophical tradition) the structure of dialectics, as a pattern in the 
development of ideas where a thesis is countered by its anti-thesis, 
generating a synthesis, on a higher level of insight than its two 
predecessors. Finally, Marx applied both the critical philosophy of Kant 
and the dialectics of Hegel on the history of economy, appointing the 
working class as the proper counterforce to the ruling capital owners, 
who should bring history toward a new, classless society without 
exploitation of any people. From this tradition, critical dialectics has 
become the normal pattern not only of political contest, but of political 
discourse in general: opposite views meet in debates and discussions 
with an aim (although not always expressed explicitly) to arrive at some 
kind of new and improved insight in the form of a synthesis. 
The theory of Marx came to become a decisive support for the 
political struggle of industrial workers in many countries and, exactly in 
accordance with his dialectics, there developed a synthesis in the form 
of a social democracy that came to characterise most of Western Europe 
for a long period. Ironically enough we can thus say that the 
dissemination of the ideas of Marx has postponed the fulfilment of his 
own prophecy that capitalism one day will fall. 
The ideas of Marx also became a great source of inspiration for 
other kinds of revolts by suppressed groups – and by their advocates – 
all over the world. His ideas, however, were also used by those who 
suppressed others, such as in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, 
China, and in totalitarian regimes in the Third World. The ideas of Marx 
were used to develop alternative ideologies to capitalism, ideologies that 
often were labelled ‘Marxism’. Especially at a time with a large faith in 
science and rationality it was heavily emphasised that Marxism 
constitutes a ‘scientific truth’, and great efforts were made to lay a 
consistent, logical structure onto this ideology, so that it could serve as a 
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theoretical superstructure, whether it was for a revolt of the suppressed 
or to strengthen the power of the suppressors. In this way Marxism 
fulfilled the criteria of instrumental knowledge as these are specified in 
chapter 3: it became, for those who professed it, normative, 
conventional and logically explicable. But in that way it also became an 
self-centred knowledge, in the sense described earlier in this book, and 
that which had been the original ethical initiative in Marx’s criticism of 
capitalism’s suppression of the industrial workers disappeared gradually 
out of sight. This development did not take place everywhere, however, 
and these differences in applications illustrate exactly what has earlier 
been said about the consequences of developing instrumental 
knowledge: in the cases where knowledge became both normative, 
conventional and explicable, ethics, which may have been the initial 
cause for developing the knowledge, withered away, as knowledge 
having these three properties became egocentric. Said otherwise: a 
sincere wish for a more just world can only partly be supported by 
rational constructions and systems; there will always have to be an 
element that this rationality can never conceive: my particular obligation 
towards the particular other. 
In the 1960s and 70s there emerged a new interest in ‘the moral 
Marx’, that is, Marx without the totalitarian ‘Marxist’ ideology. One 
talked about a neo-Marxism. One outcome of this was the ‘68 revolt’ 
initiated by French students in May 1968. This revolt became the 
beginning of a period witnessing various protests against the lack of 
ethics in the market economy, such as protests against environmental 
devastation, against the increasing global gap between rich and poor, 
and also the feminist criticism and revolts against the suppression of 
women in a capitalist economy. In this way critical dialectics, based on 
the tradition of Kant, Hegel and Marx as described above, became 
paradigmatic for various categories of dissents and protests. 
What does Levinas bring into this situation? To the method of 
critical dialectics Levinas would raise the following, disquieting question: 
in what position am I to criticise the Other by saying that he or she is 
wrong and that I am right? To Levinas, in the encounter with the Other, 
the Other is my teacher and my master. In the next turn, though, in 
society, where there are also other others, I will have to compare and 
acquire knowledge in order to judge between different postulates and 
arguments. But still I have no reason to say that the Other is wrong. In 
fact, wouldn’t it be more ‘Levinasian’ to say that the Other is always 
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right within his or her own (subjective) context? Is not the opinion of 
another exactly what it must be, considering the social and political 
context in which it has been generated? And in the same way, what is 
proposed from my critical perspective as an alternative ‘truth’, isn’t that 
also what it must be, viewed in the context in which my knowledge is 
generated? What prevents this contextual view on knowledge to end in a 
total ethical relativism and in the popular view of post-modern language 
games as an arena where ‘anything goes’, however, is for Levinas the 
absolute objectivity of the Other and the call for responsibility from the 
Other. 
As we have seen in earlier chapters, Levinas joins a philosophical 
tradition where truth cannot be considered independent of language. 
The method of critical dialectics is not only a way of arriving at higher 
levels of insight. It is also a linguistic game, constituting the reality it 
describes, or, to use a philosophical term, constructing an ontology. In a 
response to one of his colleagues who is best known for his rethinking 
of ontology, Jacques Derrida, Levinas says: 
 May not Derrida’s work cut into the development of Western thinking 
with a line of demarcation similar to Kantianism, which separated 
dogmatic philosophy from critical philosophy? Are we again at the end 
of a naïveté, of an unsuspected dogmatism which slumbered at the base 
of that which we took for critical spirit? (Levinas, 1991c: 3) 
In order to meet and bring an end to dogmatic thinking, critical 
dialectics has been, and probably still is, the most successful remedy. 
Critical dialectics is developed to ‘beat’ dogmatic thinking. It is a 
weapon forged for questioning ruling ideas, theories and ideologies, and 
still saving what is worth saving through a synthesis. Therefore, when 
this method is applied in the critique of the global market economy it, 
mostly tacitly, presupposes that business life is also based on some kind 
of dogmatic ideas, theories and/or ideologies. The apparent lack of 
effect of these attacks on common business life and the global market 
economy, however, may be caused by the possible fact that business 
conduct is not based on any dogmatic thought, nor any ideology – it may 
not even depend on a theory. The consistent theories presented in 
business textbooks may not be as indispensable to business life as the 
educators wish to think. Business life is both historically and culturally 
based on pragmatics, not on theory. Economic and business practice does 
not need any theoretical base; being based on self-interest makes it self-
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sufficient. This property of self-sufficiency is exactly why Levinas chose 
the economy as the point of departure in his introduction to the Other 
and to ethics in Totality and Infinity: economy is the proper and self-
sustained home of the self-interest without need of any reflection, 
theory or ideology. To Levinas economy is synonymous with ontology, 
with the said, our conception of what there is, supported by language. 
And from this point of departure he proceeded to that which is beyond 
ontology, or, rather, to that which is ‘more ontological than ontology’ 
(Levinas, 1998: 90), that is the Other, who can be experienced only 
ethically, as responsibility. In other words, if ethics is ‘more ontological 
than ontology’, then what has earlier been regarded as ‘ontology’ must 
then be something ‘less ontological’ than what it earlier was considered 
to be. 
What does this mean in terms of consequences? There is, as we 
know, daily a lot of brutality, violence and killing in the world. But to 
point at the market economy or capitalism as an explanation for this 
brutality, or, alternatively, to use it as an excuse, is to consider these 
constructions as  ‘more ontological’ than their assumed consequences. 
That would be to take the responsibility away from those who are 
responsible. Similarly, when the President of the United States uses 
linguistic constructions such as ‘The War against Terrorism’ or ‘The 
Gift of Freedom’ as reasons to kill many people and to cause great 
suffering to even more, or when Islamic suicide bombers use ‘Jihad’ as 
an explanation for their fatal actions, both obviously consider such 
construction to be ‘more ontological’ than what they can possibly be 
after Levinas. They deny the responsibility that actually is ‘more 
ontological’ than these linguistic constructions. Although one should 
have no illusions that neither the President of the United States nor an 
Islamic suicide bomber will change his or her behaviour as soon as they 
are confronted with this ‘more ontological’ responsibility, it may have an 
effect in more everyday cases if it is acknowledged that the market 
economy is used as either an explanation or excuse in the moment the 
responsibility for the consequences are acknowledged as ‘more 
ontological’. 
This way of looking at responsibility meets another obstacle in the 
much used demarcation line that has been drawn between deontological 
(or ‘Kantian’) and consequential (or ‘utilitarian’) ethics in so many 
textbook presentations of ethics. This distinction is commonly viewed 
as two mutually exclusive alternative approaches to ethics. The lesson 
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from Levinas may change this: the presence of the third necessitates 
great efforts in comparing, calculations and knowledge about 
consequences and efficiency, very much similar to what we know from 
applications of utilitarian ethics, as we know from, for instance, cost-
benefit analyses. When Levinas emphasises the motivation for just 
solutions, however, as the call for responsibility from the encounter 
with the Other, this can hardly be viewed as other than a further 
elaboration of the deontological ethics within the Kantian tradition. In 
other words, both elements are necessary, and Levinas has made it 
possible to leave ontology to economics, language and utilitarianism, 
while ‘real’ ethics is a further development of Kant, but placed prior to 
language. In cases where ethics is perverted it is very often because one 
has chosen one of these two elements and excluded the other. For 
instance, an ‘ethics of closeness’ expresses a responsibility to the Other 
that excludes the third, while exploitation of workers often following 
from pursuing efficiency as a virtue avoids the encounter with the 
individual Other. After Levinas these two ‘ethics’ do not need to come 
into conflict with each other because they have different domains of 
application: calculations, efficiency, consequences and justice belong to 
the generalised abstractions of society, while responsibility and 
obligation towards the Other belong to the particular, unique and real 
events of encounters. 
Levinas elaborates on this distinction by denoting the first as morality 
and the latter as ethics: 
By morality I mean a series of rules relating to social behaviour and civic 
duty. But while morality thus operates in the socio-political order of 
organizing and improving our human survival, it is ultimately founded 
on an ethical responsibility towards the other. As prima philosophia, ethics 
cannot itself legislate for society or produce rules of conduct whereby 
society might be revolutionised or transformed. It does not operate at 
the level of the manifesto or call to order; it is not a savoir vivre. When I 
talk of ethics as a ‘dis-inter-estedness’, I do not mean that it is 
indifference; I simply mean that it is a form of vigilant passivity to the 
call of the other, which precedes our interest in being, our inter-est, as a 
being-in-the-world attached to property and appropriating what is other 
than itself to itself. Morality is what governs the world of political ‘inter-
estedness’, the social interchanges between citizens in a society. Ethics, 
as the extreme exposure and sensitivity of one subjectivity to another, 
becomes morality and hardens its skin as soon as we move into the 
political world of the impersonal ‘third’ – the world of government, 
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institutions, tribunals, prisons, schools, committees, and so on. But the 
norm that must continue to inspire and direct the moral order is the 
ethical norm of the interhuman. If the moral-political order totally 
relinquishes its ethical foundation, it must accept all forms of society, 
including the fascist or totalitarian, for it can no longer evaluate or 
discriminate between them. The state is usually better than anarchy – 
but not always. In some instances, – fascism or totalitarianism, for 
example – the political order of the state may have to be challenged in 
the name of our ethical responsibility to the other. This is why ethical 
philosophy must remain the first philosophy. (Levinas, in Levinas and 
Kearney, 1986: 29-30) 
The source of ethics, which is the call of the Other in the singular and 
physical event of an encounter, can never be carried directly over to 
some general theory without being reduced. There are in fact lots of 
ethics in society, wherever people meet, both within and outside 
organizations, but they disappear too easily as we retreat to ideas and 
theories. It is the good, prior to any language, and not language itself, 
that keeps human relations together. Without it, life would be 
unbearable. 
Certainly we, and in particular we who happen to belong to the 
privileged rich part of the world, find ourselves trapped in power 
structures in which we are forced to participate, violating others, 
relations in which we do not want to participate. But that is exactly why 
the only way to put ethics into practice requires that these consistent 
structures are revealed as serving the interests of the self and then, after 
being called by the Other, to make efforts to change these structures, if 
not more than just a little bit, in the direction of always more justice. 
To sum up: Instead of arriving at some ethical prescriptions, for 
instance in the form of specific answers and guidelines to social and 
political questions, Levinas starts with recognising and acknowledging 
economic, self-centred conduct as a universal human need, from which 
no one can escape, in the sense of positioning oneself above others. 
Included in this thinking is the need to understand, to comprehend, and 
to control, by developing instrumental knowledge, as this is described 
earlier in this book. Then he reminds us that human life is more than 
economy: there are also the particular events when one is called to 
responsibility by the Other. And although these events cannot be 
thematised, their consequences can, which are, as we have described in 
the previous chapter, efforts towards always more justice. 
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In an attempt to make this point even more concrete, I will close 
this book by going back to the example of chapters 3 and 5, with the 
financial director who is given the task to produce a budget for the 
hospital within new and more austere financial restrictions set by the 
top leaders, and the nurse who is responsible for the care in one of the 
units of the hospital that is obliged to reduce its workforce. Above both 
these leaders is the general director of the hospital, having a 
responsibility for the entire institution. His or her instructions to the 
financial manager should be to produce a just and right budget, in 
accordance with the mission given to the hospital by society. The 
budget that is to be elaborated by the financial manager should be 
regarded as just by those who are involved, and a condition for 
obtaining this is that everyone has an experience of being met as 
individuals by their leaders in the concrete encounters during the 
process. Only then can they accept the brutality of justice, and only then 
can they contribute by working efficiently, for the patient, or, if it had 
been a private company, for the customer. However, this will require 
from the responsible leaders a sufficiently good professional and 
substantial knowledge about what the organization is in fact doing. 
Knowledge in business management alone will not be sufficient. On the 
other hand, however, no knowledge or theory of any kind will be 
sufficient. There is no such thing as a system that to a sufficient extent 
takes care of justice. Systems have to be populated by people who can 
see the violations caused by the system itself and which in the meeting 
with others are questioned and thereby struck by the idea of the good 
and seek to transform this idea into always more justice. This implies 
constantly moving between mercy and justice, between ethics and 
ontology. In this lies the necessity of ethics. It requires a human being, 
no more, no less. 
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